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ABSTRACT
The world is again experiencing a new period of change 
today. The cold war has ended and the strategic environment is 
changing to reflect those developments. The objective of this 
study is to describe the changes in naval mission types after 
the end of the cold war.
An analytical method has been used in the study; the 
developments in the naval strategic environnment will be 
described in a detailed way. Then the study will try to 
analyse those developments and try to explain how the naval 
power missions will be redefined according the new factors.
The naval strategic environment is becoming littoral and 
also more prone to conflictual situations as more states try 
to seek their national interests, once they are free from the 
binding conditions of the old bi-polar strategic environment. 
Some naval missions that were the needs of the global scale 
confrontation of the cold war will not be of the same 
importance in this new period. Instead the mission types that 
can be described as regional and coastal will be more used by 
the navies of the world reflecting the rise of littorality in 
the new period.
IV
ÖZET
Dünya buğun büyük bir değişme surecinin içinde. Soğuk savasin sona 
ermesiyle beraber stratejik konjonktürde de değişmeler olmakta. Bu 
calisma sozu edilen değişmelerin donanmalarin görevleri üzerinde olan 
etkisini arastirmakta ve bu görevlerdeki değişmeleri konu edinmektedir.
Calismada analitik bir metodoloji uygulanmistir. ilk önce soğuk 
savas sonrasinda donanmalar ve denizlerdeki stratejik dengelerde olan 
değişmeler İncelenmekte sonrada bulunan sonuclarin donanmalarin 
görevlerinde nasil değişikler yapacagi tartisilmaktadir.
Denizlerdeki yeni stratejik ortam superguc dengesini ortadan 
kaybolmasiyla bölgesel olarak tanimlanabilir. 0te yandan ülkeler soğuk 
savas esnasindaki bloklaşmadan kaynaklanan politik ve stratejik 
bagimliliklardan kurtuldukça, kendi cikarlarini kollamak için daha cok 
israrli olmaktadirlar. Bu şekilde gelecekte denizlerde bölgesel 
catismalarin cikma olasiliginin artmasi beklenebilir. Tum bunlarin 
donanmalarin görevleri üzerindeki etkilerinin ise eski global capli 
operasyon tiplerinden daha lokal projeksiyonla modellere bir gecis 
seklinde olacagi düşünülmektedir. Bu dusunce de calismanin sonuç 
bulgusunu teşkil etmektedir.
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List Of Abbreviations
AA Anti-Air Craft
AAW Anti Air Warfare
ASW Anti submarine Warfare
AEW/C Air Early Warning And Control
ASuW Anti Surface Warfare
ATBM Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile
DDG Guided Missile armed Destroyer
FFG Guided missile armed Frigate
ICS Shorthand for command, communication ,control and 
intelligence
SAM Surface to air missile 
SLOC Sea line of communication 
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SSBN Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine
SSK Diesel and Electric powered submarine
SSM Surface to surface missile
SSN Nuclear powered torpedo attack submarine
SSGN Nuclear powered guided missile submarine
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Current Naval Context
Today the world is experiencing a new period of changes. 
Germany is again one nation; The European Community strives 
toward a United Europe; Eastern Asia continues to thrive 
economically and hints at playing a more prominent global 
role; China attempts to mix political antiquity with economic 
modernization; and most important of all, international 
politics is no longer centred on two poles.
The relationship between the United States and the nev/ly 
independent states of the former USSR will greatly change the 
future of their strategic plannings. The previous state of 
hostility has decreased and eventually vanished in the last 
few years. Today a level of mutual understanding and 
co-operation between these groups exists. Russia has deviated 
from the policies of the former USSR. The sharp decline of 
activity of the former Soviet Union beyond its own borders and 
especially out-of area naval operations indicates this 
commitment of the present Russian government.
Like most of the major NATO navies, the United States 
Navy will shrink over the next decade. While some of the bases 
will be retained during rapid reaction programs, there will be 
also withdrawals from some of the bases and installations. A 
number of task force groups will be kept ready to intervene in
any crisis situation.^ Some of the hardware intended primarily 
for a total war against the Soviet Fleet in the open seas will 
also be retired gradually or transferred to the allied 
countries. Similarly, even more comprehensive down-sizing 
efforts exist in the other major Western navies. This decrease 
in naval unit deployments and exercises will continue. Forward 
presence of these forces will decline, and revisit time to the 
remote areas will become longer.^
As indicated in the words of a former American official^ 
there is a growing concern that the disappearance of 
superpower rivalry in the Third World after the cold war will 
cause the regional powers to fill the power vacuum created by 
the withdrawal of the superpowers from some regions of the 
world.
1.2 Objective Of The Study
Naval settings of the last half century are now in a 
period of transition. The end of the cold war, while phasing 
out the old environment, has opened up new dimensions to the 
naval environment. The new environment will not be like the 
previous one that rested on the two superpower pillars.
, Despite the passing away of the cold war, there are still 
areas of trouble where political developments may lead to 
serious conflicts. The security in the world today is equally 
hard to maintain as was in the cold war.
This study will focus on the change in the naval missions 
after the end of the cold war. Navies are the instruments of
states and are directly governed by them. The states, in turn 
are affected by the developments that take place in the 
international community and the ruling economic and political 
conditions of the period. Therefore a strong link exists 
between those conditions of the period and the type of naval 
operations undertaken by the states. Therefore due to the 
change in the political conditions, the states will ask the 
accomplishment of different types of naval missions from their 
navies.
The study aims to answer the question of how naval 
missions have been modified to include new dimensions. The 
study will try to show that some naval missions will emerge as 
more important than others since those types will be more 
suited to the conditions of the new naval strategic 
environment. It is vital to identify emerging conditions in 
the new naval strategic environment to predict which naval 
missions will be emphasized in the future.
Naval missions after the cold war will be adjusted to the 
requirements of the new strategic environment of the post-cold 
war era. Therefore it would be an important step of the study 
to analyse and identify the emerging conditions in the naval 
strategic environment in the new period. The important trend 
that appears in the political, economic and military 
dimensions will be analysed during the study.
1.3 Methodology Of The Study
Several different types of information sources have been 
used in this study. These include conventional sources such as 
books, yearly volumes of research institutes and periodicals, 
as well as information received from electronic databases, 
personal correspondence through E-Mail and normal mail. Due to 
the recent nature of the subject of the study periodicals, 
journals and other contemporary sources of information were 
frequently used. In addition, the study has also used books 
and dissertations.
The methodology used in the study can be described as 
.follows : the developments of the new period will be presented 
in the chapters of the study whose outline is given below. The 
ansv/er to the research question has been sought by the 
interpretation of these results. Therefore an analytical 
approach can be said to have been employed in the study.
1.4 Outline Of The Study
The study will commence with the effort for the 
construction of a framework for naval missions. The framework 
is important since developments of the post-cold war period 
will be examined under this perspective. The roles of the 
naval powers are grouped into three main topics and definition 
of these roles are documented in detail in the rest of the 
second chapter. The aim of the framework is to present a
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systemic approach to the analysis of the factors that will be 
examined in the other chapters of the study.
The third chapter will study the developments in the 
naval military technology which is vital for the understanding 
of factors that will shape the nature of future operations. A 
greatly accelerated technological advance has left its mark on 
the world in our decade. The military technology in use by the 
naval forces is certainly affected from this technological 
revolution. This chapter will try to examine the increasing 
availability of the high-technology weapons systems that 
affect naval operations. The diffusion of vital high 
technology weapons into some of the navies of the Third World 
countries will also be studied.
The fourth chapter is devoted to a description of the new 
strategic environment after the cold war. A number of 
specially selected areas will be examined. New geopolitics in 
those areas with a high probability of conflict will be 
detailed with an eye on the naval environment.
Change in the naval missions is explored in the 
concluding part of the study. The aim of this chapter is to 
further strengthen the argument that the naval missions of the 
post-cold war era will be different from the missions of the 
cold war era. After analyzing the cumulative changes observed 
in the factors that shape the naval environment, this part of 
the study will try to identify new naval missions that will 
rise in importance and those that will be pushed back in 
priority because of their unsuitability to the conditions of 
the new period.
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II A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF NAVAL POWER
2.1 A Framework For Naval Missions
This study has focused on the role of navies in the 
post-cold war period, and therefore, a systemic approach to 
the role of navies must be attempted to gain insight on the 
role of international navies. An understanding of the workings 
of the concept of naval power is imperative for analyzing the 
changes brought about by the developments of the last half 
decade. Therefore, the formulation of a framework is 
essential. This framework will also provide the reader with a 
perspective throughout the study.
The roles that can be performed by naval forces and the 
extent to which they can be executed are indicators of the 
significance of a navy. In the light of national interest 
priorities and economic constraints, decision makers try to 
give the best decisions for the ultimate balance between 
functionality and size of naval forces.
Authors in the field of strategic studies have defined 
the role of sea power in various ways. While all of these 
definitions have been essential for understanding the missions 
of naval forces, there has been a general tendency in all of 
these systematic representations, to segregate the role of 
naval forces into specifically defined classes.
However, many of the tasks that are performed by navies 
are highly complementary of each other. Conventional naval
12
The use of the sea for mobility is important. While air 
and land lines may be faster, they can not cope with large 
amounts easily. By airlift, smaller pieces can be brought in 
as well as personnel, however it's not possible to move large 
loads by this way. Land transportation networks may not always 
exist to carry the lift over long distances. It is much 
cheaper and efficient in moving large amounts of materials 
using the maritime routes. In the words of Mahan, sea is 
something like a great highway over which men and materials 
pass on all directions.®
The exploitation of the sea as the source of precious 
minerals, food and valuable energy deposits is another 
important type of sea use. Utilization of marine resources has 
become very important, particularly in this century. With the 
increasing population of the world and the decreasing deposits 
of precious minerals and sources of food, man has increasingly 
sought these resources in the oceans. This type of the use of 
the sea plays a very important part in the economies of some 
countries.
Passage of military forces and the use of naval forces 
against the targets at land or sea constitutes the basis of 
the military use of the sea medium. The military use of the 
sea is actually the reason for the creation of the naval 
forces.
14
2.3 Naval Missions
Naval missions are formulated under direct influence of 
the concept of the use of the sea. The uniqueness of naval 
force brings its missions a multi-faceted aspect. A naval 
mission is formed and carried out on the basis of a number of 
military, economic or political rationales.
While naval missions can be grouped under headings, some 
types of naval missions can be seen as the extension of other 
naval missions under a different heading. They are linked with 
each other to a great extent.
The naval missions are studied under three guidelines 
that are the main roles of a navy; they can be divided into 
the following groups :
1. Military Roles
2. Diplomatic Roles
3. Constabulary Roles
As some authors have suggested, the military roles of the 
navies form the basis of the their other roles.^ Since the real 
meaning of the navy lies in its ability to use force and form 
a threat, that actually shapes and gives meaning to the 
missions it carries out. Missions that' fall under the military 
role of the navies are the operations that a state uses in 
pursuing its foreign policy objectives in a conflict.
The diplomatic role of a navy is dependent on its 
military essence. It also carries out the task of representing 
the foreign policy objectives of a state, however it does not
15
extend into waging a formal conflict with naval forces of 
other states in while doing so.
The constabulary role of a navy is less dependent on the 
use of actual force and the extent of naval power. Due to its 
nature that covers sovereignty issues and management of good 
order, it is a both internally and externally oriented role of 
the naval forces.
Under the light of the above definitions, naval missions 
that fall under these three roles can be described as follows:
Military,Roles
Command And Control Of The Sea
Command and control of the sea is perhaps the most 
frequently used term of the naval strategic terminology. It 
has been described as "... nothing but the total control of 
the sea communications" by Julian Corbet.® This is considered 
as a rather loose and incomplete definition by some leading 
writers who argue that the total command over all the lines of 
communication may not be practically possible since these may 
cover vast sea areas which require great numbers of naval 
units.® In this framework, the size of the zone of control of 
each unit is small. The basic characteristic of the sea 
environment does not allow for the expansion of this zone due 
to several natural factors such as non-penetrability of 
underwater by radar or acoustic barriers that baffle sonars. 
The command of the sea is therefore directly related to the 
number of assets deployed in the area, specifically intended
16
for command. Despite the advances that increased the radius of 
control from the maximum line of sight of a mast-placed 
lookout to a range of 100-150 km, it is still not possible to 
use all these actively in all situations. Using a radar to 
increase the range of detection to this range may be risky in 
war because of the presence of radiation homing anti-radar 
weapons such as the American Harm or British Martel. Besides, 
using a radar also means that once an enemy is detected, it 
will also be able to detect the emitter by the help of its 
radar warning receiver instruments. Therefore, achieving even 
this range has some disadvantages such as giving up the 
element of surprise. Without the benefit of this technology, 
it is only possible to command limited areas of the sea.
No sea power managed to rule the sea in history so 
completely that no intruder was able to slip by its guard. 
There has always been the chance that a craft may lurk in a 
part of the sea that is believed to be under one's command.
The successes of the German commerce raiders of World War I 
and II v/hich, despite the constant Allied air and surface 
patrols managed to prey upon shipping until the end of the 
v/ar, are good examples that illustrate this fact.
Some writers have also brought forward a limited ·
"control" concept as the command of the sea around a point 
with tightly drawn boundaries rather than vaguely defined 
regions.“ "Control" of the sea can be sought to be provided in 
a well-defined area of strategic or tactical importance. The 
protection provided by the anti-submarine or anti aircraft 
ring around a carrier group or a convoy are good examples for 
the control concept. The concept itself can also be expanded
17
into a sea area with clearly defined borders such as maritime 
routes, fishing areas, exclusion zones and approaches to 
important naval bases or straits.
Denial Of Sea
The denial of the sea is directly related with the use of 
the sea. Whereas a state would try to increase its share of 
sea under its control and use it, it would also try to prevent 
the other sides from doing so at the same time in a conflict. 
The denial of the sea or "challenge and the prevention of the 
use of the sea to other states" according to Ken Booth, 
actually formed the basis of the national policies of some 
states such as USSR during the cold war and France in the 19'"' 
century.The denial of sea operations have varying 
efficiencies; the state that has more economic ties with the 
outside by sea lines is more sensitive to such operations.
Denying a zone of sea to the enemy completely is a 
difficult task to perform. The allied offensive to drive 
German submarines from the Atlantic failed since the Germans 
always managed to counter it; either by dispersing when hunter 
killer groups operated in their area or moving away from the 
likely patrol areas of such groups.It is clear that in the 
face of a resourceful and skilful opponent sea-denial may not 
always work, since the defender, taking advantage of the sea 
medium can always find weak spots in the attacker's plans and 
neutralize its efforts.
The command or control of 'the sea is not a prerequisite 
for mounting a sea-denial operation, nor does it ensure 
success. Indeed, the German navy and air force effectively
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implemented this strategy during World War II, in the Bay of 
Biscay, Norwegian and Barents Seas, where Germany had partial 
or no command at all. In contrast, the allied antisubmarine 
"offensive" in the Atlantic that was performed by groups of 
ships that searched and attacked submarines independently 
amounted to little.Thus it can be suggested that sea denial 
operations can be advantageous to both sides and do not really 
rest only on the superiority of one's military assets.
The tools of sea-denial generally have offensive oriented 
capabilities and are of limited use in other types of 
missions. The introduction of aircraft, missile carrying boats 
and submarines in the 20'''’' century may have greatly increased 
the effectiveness of the sea-denial operations. However, apart 
from engaging the enemy, they cannot be expected to control 
and defend the area they are ordered to deny. Therefore, with 
its operational objectives clearly defined, sea denial m.ay 
continue to be one of the most frequently used type of naval 
missions.
Naval Deterrence
It has been stated by some naval writers that strength at 
sea is the best preserver of peace and national security. 
Similarly, Mahan also wrote that the surest way to maintain 
peace is "... to occupy a position of menace".^® It was on the 
basis of this factor that the Royal Navy deterred any 
potential aggressors during the 19”'" century. Strength and 
general capacity to prevail, or at least to give a sufficient 
account of oneself, is the main constituent of deterrence. As 
stated by Geoffrey Till, the extent of a navy's deterrence may
19
be judged from its ability to respond to any level or form of 
aggression anywhere, anytime/’
Nuclear deterrence has played an important part in cold 
war strategy, dominating all other strategies until the 
passing away of the cold war. This also affected and led to 
changes in naval deterrence. The deterrence of seapower is 
loosely and indirectly related with nuclear means. Some navies 
designed several types of tactical nuclear anti-ship, 
anti-aircraft and ASW weapons in the 1950 and 1960s. These 
weapons have never been used in any engagement; the 
after-effects of such weapons are undesirable and could affect 
friend and foe alike.’®
The conventional dimension of naval deterrence is much 
more important in naval strategy. When planning to invade the 
Falkland Islands in 1982, the Argentinean navy was not 
deterred by British nuclear fire power. The reason was simple, 
no navy can fire a tactical attack, let alone a strategic 
nuclear weapon in a situation short of global nuclear war. A 
few years after the Falklands incident, a tiny Libyan navy in 
1986 did not even hesitate to try to engage the nuclear armed 
US carrier battle group operating in the Gulf of Sidra. Many 
other incidents are present where the presence of nuclear 
weapons in one side did not quite bother assailants. That 
reflects the need to assess the deterrent power of a navy.
The different characteristics of the medium of the sea 
make the concept of deterrence different from those of land 
operations. The process of escalation that is central in the 
deterrence concept moves at a faster pace in the naval 
environment; slightest misunderstanding of one's move during
20
encounters between the naval forces of countries with 
problematic relations may easily result in armed clashes. It 
may be argued that there is less refrain to open fire by naval 
forces in situations where other types of forces may hold back 
from opening fire. The reason may be the that peripheral 
properties of naval operations seldom make them individually 
decisive in the outcome of the wars. As Julian Corbet has 
noted;
"Since men live upon the land and not on the sea, 
great issues between nations at war have always been 
decided - except in the rarest cases -by what your 
army can do against your territory and national life 
or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it 
possible for your army to do.^ °"
The sea power may have contributed to many victories but 
it has remained far from achieving a decision on its own. 
Therefore the escalation in naval environment has a different 
pace than the escalation process at other media.
The central idea in naval deterrence is the ability to 
bear power against the enemy instantly, should the need arise. 
This ability of navies provides credibility which Ken Booth 
describes as "Naval Prestige".It was this kind of a 
credibility, that deterred the German naval commanders from 
actively engaging the English Fleet in the major naval actions 
of the First World War. Despite having capital ships and crews 
the German High Seas Fleet usually restrained itself from 
taking on the British Fleet.
A low level of credibility ultimately means less 
deterrence for a navy. This was the case for the Russian Fleet 
in 1904. Japanese naval planners viewed the Russian fleet as 
an opponent which could be defeated by the smaller Imperial
21
Japanese Navy. Similarly the Japanese also regarded the United 
States Fleet in the same way. Before embarking upon their 
plans to create a "co-prosperity sphere" in Asia, they 
attempted to neutralize it. The notion of deterrence in all 
cases is common: assessment of strength through the eyes of 
the adversary. Particularly, the lesser susceptibility of 
naval strength to information gathering and estimation methods 
should be taken into some consideration. History of naval 
conflicts has a large number of such examples of 
misinterpretation of the deterrence capability of the enemy.
In conclusion, naval deterrence is largely conventional 
and must work at all levels of a conflict. In the words of an 
analyst it must be prepared in a "seamless robe" fashion. 
However this requires a high level of naval capability, though 
that is difficult to achieve for most of the states since the 
cost of such a naval force will be prohibitively expensive.
Power Projection
The introduction of longer range weapons to ships ( and 
eventually to submarines ) and the extension of endurances 
beginning in the mid 19th century have enabled the naval 
forces to increase their area of control over' the land as 
well. While the definition of basic naval power projection 
mission has been accepted as; "... a navy's ability to launch 
sea-based air and ground attacks against enemy targets 
onshore. It also includes naval gun bombardments of enemy 
naval forces at ports and installations“ " , the scope of naval 
power projection missions has been defined in a wide range. 
While the lowest level of power projection is given by
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Stansfield Turner who has written about "projection of power 
through presence" of naval units, the definition of highest 
level of power projection as "nuclear strikes against the 
enemy land targets" is commonly accepted by many sources.
Operations of fleets ashore which include the operations 
of the surface units, submarines and naval aviation against a 
ground target, or in short the projection of naval power on 
land is one of the key concepts of the military use of navies. 
In this study the power projection will be examined in the 
following stages. At one end, there's the reactive, preventive 
presence of warships, the middle range is occupied by air and 
naval bombardment, higher up are amphibious assaults. The 
ultimate form of power projection links with another mission 
of navies; the strategic deterrence. The presence of SSBNs 
with their missiles ready to reach anywhere in the territory 
of the targeted nation, allows a country to gain the highest 
level of power projection; exercising its military might over 
the whole of the enemy area if the need arises.
Power projection ability gives naval forces the power to 
strike in any direction and anywhere along the coasts of enemy 
territory. This is actually the main advantage of naval power 
projection. The tactical and strategic surprise provided by 
amphibious attacks has always been found to be critical in the 
achievement of victory. While the possibility of an amphibious 
attack on its coast may be known to a state, the information 
about the exact timing and the location of the landing will be 
quite difficult to obtain. The surprise on the German side 
about the timing and place of the Normandy landing in 1944 
despite signs showing that the imminence of the invasion, is a
23
good example that illustrates this. Similarly, each of the 
Anzio and Torch landings in the European theatre and 
Guadacanal operation in the Pacific came as strategic and 
tactical surprises to the defender.This aspect of amphibious 
operations against the enemy territory has also been 
acknowledged by Admiral Gorskov, who went on to note that the 
amphibious operations of the World War II were always 
successful due to the reason described above.Perhaps it was 
because of such motives in Soviet thinking that the Soviet 
navy vigorously upgraded its naval power projection capability 
in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Power projection in the global or regional dimension is a 
rather expensive luxury enjoyed only by a small number of 
navies in the world. Even in a regional dimension projection 
of force demands sizeable and balanced naval or naval air 
force that can penetrate through any naval defensive barrier, 
and defeat land-borne aerial attack intending to deny the area 
of operations. Previous experience has shown that a presence 
of a carrier or at least amphibious assault ships is a 
prerequisite for a successful conduct of operations. The 
availability of immediate anti-aircraft defence in the form of 
fighter aircraft operating from nearby platforms is very 
important. This fact has been demonstrated in the course of 
the Falklands War, where the availability of low performance 
Harrier aircraft to the British enabled them to fend off many 
Argentinean air attacks. Global projection of power, on the 
other hand can only be carried out by one remaining 
superpower. Only, the United States navy deploys the surface
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action and carrier battlegroups that have the capability to 
project power on any part of the globe.
Naval power projection is a multi-faceted mission. At one 
extreme, the ultimate power projection is nuclear strategic 
deterrence - which is actually another military role of the 
navies. At the other extreme, naval power projection is linked 
to the diplomatic role of the navy. Some exercises of land 
operations performed by navies for projecting their power 
overland such as the landing of small contingents actually 
overlap with some practises of gunboat diplomacy where similar 
operations are undertaken. The operations of the Royal Navy in 
the Yellow Sea during the early 1920s are good examples of
this.27
Diplomatic Role Of The Navy
Gunboat Diplomacy
The most commonplace of diplomatic roles for the navy has 
been gunboat diplomacy. This aspect of navies has been long
recognized by the authors of the subject as a positive
• » 2 8  * · spin-off of the employment of navies. Gunboat diplomacy is
considered by some v/riters as the type of missions carried out
by the naval forces whose governments
"... try to affect the thinking and behaviour of the 
other governments with little or no use of force 
with their navies.
The employment of navies in a diplomatic mode of 
operation may widely vary in character. While some writers
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like Eric Grove have covered the diplomatic role of a navy- 
under a number of headings such as "gunboat diplomacy" and 
"showing the flag" in accordance with the level of force and 
degree of political resolve employed,^“ this study examines the 
subject under the single heading of gunboat diplomacy. However 
the mission of gunboat diplomacy has been divided into four 
classes as James Cable -a noted writer of the subject, has 
classified :
"1. Definitive - When A fait accompli is created.
2. Purposeful - to induce 'someone else to take a 
decision which would otherwise not have been taken : 
to do something or to stop doing it or to refrain 
from a contemplated course of action.
3. Catalytic - 'a situation arises pregnant with a 
formless menace or offering obscene opportunities. 
Something that is felt is going to happen which 
might otherwise be prevented if force were available 
at the critical point. Advantages , their nature and 
the manner of their achievements still undetermined 
, might be reaped by those able to put intermediate 
power behind their sickle.
4. Expressive - 'to express attitudes , to lend 
verisimilitude to otherwise unconvincing statements 
or to provide outlets for emotion."^’
This function of naval power can be exercised by almost 
any naval power, at almost any level. The determination and 
the timing of such a move is much more important rather than 
its strength; the display of force is used to affect the 
perception of the other side about the question at hand.
A much inferior opponent may have the opportunity of 
humiliating its adversary by skilful use of naval assets. This 
leads to the fact that even a small state can be successful 
with its small fleet. In the words of a writer; "the trappings
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of naval diplomacy have made all states equal.Highlighted 
by incidents like the case of the P u e b l o , even■superpowers 
were not immune from effects in this type of combat.
The hardware needed for naval diplomacy is different from 
other naval missions. Only surface assets can be effectively 
used in such a process. As Ken Booth has pointed out 
submarines are almost of no use; a submarine must sink a 
vessel to signal its presence.Ships must use their less 
lethal weapons such as light guns and refrain from seriously 
damaging the target. Sending a unit armed with missiles as the 
only armament is not appropriate because those weapons are 
considered as shoot-to-kill weapons. Their use will most 
certainly escalate tension since the use of shoot-to-kill 
weapons usually results in the destruction of the target or 
near-destruction of it, leaving less room for negotiation 
manoeuvres. On the other hand the weapons that offer 
flexibility such as naval guns or depth charge projectors may 
be better suited for such operations. A warship may fire a gun 
across the bows of a merchantman to stop her, however she can 
not fire a missile to achieve the same purpose. The first move 
will cause the other side to wait and think, whereas the 
second action that in all likelihood would destroy the target, 
will provoke the other side to retaliate.
Naval diplomacy is now realized as an important function 
of naval power. Therefore, it will continue to be one of the 
available options for naval planners for a long time into the 
future.
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Crisis Management And Maintenance Of Good Order
One of the functions of crisis management may be defined 
as ensuring that a potential conflict does not escalate from a 
crisis situation. As noted by most authors the flexibility 
provided by naval power allows navies to manage and prevent 
the conflictual situations successfully which makes them 
efficient tools in handling of crisis situations.. It can be 
remembered that during the Spanish civil war this flexibility 
of naval power was used by the Royal Navy to deter potential 
aggressors such as Royalist Spanish and Italian naval units 
from interfering with the evacuation of and humanitarian aid 
to the civil population without starting a conflict.^®
In this study ,the concept of naval crisis management 
v/ill be viewed from this perspective. Naval forces usually 
follow the directives of the decision makers. On the other 
hand most of the tactical handling of a case is done by the 
local naval commanders. A tactical commander may be a better 
judge of the situation and act more decisively than the 
distant higher levels of command since he is near to the scene 
and adapted to the conditions of the situation. Flexibility 
offered by the use of the naval powers comes into the use in 
this stage.
According to some naval writers, naval forces can be 
employed by the United Nations in naval operations that need 
m.ore flexibility in handling , especially in the political 
dimension.^’ It is further argued by some of these writers that
Constabulary Roles
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naval forces can give support to United Nations" efforts in 
its operations.^®
During crisis situations, tactical handling of the 
situation can be carried out by naval forces that happen to be 
close to the area of the crisis if they are present. Timely 
deployment of the forces close to the area of potential 
problem increases the chances of prompt and decisive 
intervention to defuse the crisis, adding even more 
flexibility to the handling of the crisis.
Safeguarding Of National Resources
The sea has great amounts of raw materials, sources of 
food and energy. The presence of such resources in the sea 
requires safeguarding against accidents and hostile acts. This 
is only possible by carefully designed and enforced marine 
protection regimes.
As an example the fishing activities can be taken. While 
people have caught fish from the sea for a long time, only for 
the last few decades fishing has evolved into a massive 
industry. Each year approximately seventy million tons of fish 
are caught.®® It has become a vital component of some 
countries' economy such as Japan, Iceland and Norway. However 
due to the lack of an effective regime, some fish species have 
been caught to the point of extinction. There have been 
disputes over the maximum sustainable yield and its 
allocation. This is only one of the problems that are 
encountered over the management of maritime resources. This 
and similar problems have been voiced by some authors who 
state the need for an effective international regime :
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"... to ensure that vessels comply with rules. It 
has been a tendency for countries with seabed to 
increase their areas of maritime jurisdiction. They 
have to identify, plot and monitor the activities of 
all vessels, ensuring that individuals are not 
breaking the rules in these areas.
The safeguarding of off-shore resources also requires 
controls on sea traffic. Frequent sea accidents cause a 
significant amount of pollution. The increase in the sheer 
volume of sea transport is also another reason. World's 
maritime fleet has gone up over four times in the last 35 
years.It is clear that the shipping routes must be regulated 
as the air routes. Especially in focal points, like the 
English Channel, Bosphorus, Suez and Panama canals local 
states are likely to be involved in surveillance, traffic 
schemes, identification, interception and arrest of offenders.
The navies have all the necessary qualifications to 
pursue such objectives, and they have the staying endurance 
that will allow them to patrol the areas for a long period. 
Naval forces also have a wide range of responses ranging from 
notification to prompt preventive action through use of arms, 
to give when there is need for a response to an offender.
These properties give the naval forces an advantageous 
position for such operations.
The preservation and the safeguarding of the maritime 
resources are best done by area rather than point defences. 
This is due to the geographical conditions; generally the 
resources occupy large areas. In such cases aerial 
surveillance becomes necessary. Ships must be able to respond 
actively and immediately in emergencies. Their response must
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also be proportionate to the threat or situation. Therefore 
their properties, such as being impressive, having clearly 
visible weaponry, high speed, and good sea-keeping are 
important for naval forces that will indulge in such tasks.
The endurance characteristics and manoeuvrability are also 
positive attributes.
Navies have units that are dedicated for this type of 
mission. Often called the Coast Guard, resource safeguarding 
is usually carried out by these units which are composed of 
the lighter vessels of a navy. The past record also shows that 
navies may even use their capital ships for these missions if 
the situation needs their deployment.
In the list of naval missions, the safeguarding of 
offshore sea resources is a hybrid mission of three roles at 
the same time. It encompasses military, diplomatic and the 
constabulary roles of the naval forces. The growing importance 
of the economic aspects of the use of sea makes the 
safeguarding of one state's exploitation of such resources an 
important mission.
The Framevork Of Analysis
The framework constructed above will be used in this 
study to provide a perspective for the comparative analysis of 
the developments that will be presented to support the main 
idea of the thesis. The model will also help our understanding 
of the naval power theory.
In the cold war some of the missions defined above were 
more frequently utilised than others by the naval forces.
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However, needs of the post-cold war environment will result in 
a reappraisal of naval missions and the redrawing of 
priorities.
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Ill FUTURE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND NAVAL MISSIONS
Navies have always been sensitive to the developments in 
military technology. It has generally been a technological 
factor which has led to modifications in existing missions or 
creation of new ones. The capabilities offered by the 
technological developments directly affect the naval missions. 
It must be stated that, the political needs arising from the 
situations at hand formulate the general objectives of naval 
missions. However, technological constraints define the limits 
within these mission objectives can be pursued.
Naval missions are actually the product of the technical 
and political objectives. In that respect, political 
formulations without consideration of the technological limits 
will not be sufficient. Similarly, technical capabilities are 
by definition not ends but means and therefore do not have an 
independent mission definition aspect.
Technological developments play a critical role in the 
development of naval strategy. In fact naval power is more 
sensitive to technological developments than land forces since 
its units are more technology intensive. This extensive 
dependence on technology makes the examination of the 
developments in this field vital to the study's efforts to 
focus on the future of naval power missions.
The first part of this chapter deals with the 
technological developments that are taking place which may
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affect the naval operations. This section will focus on the 
military side of developments that will shed light on the 
probable new formulations in the naval operation profiles. The 
next part is devoted to serious developments that have taken 
root in the last decades: proliferation of high military 
technology, and its products, into the Third World. This 
subject is critically linked to international security. The 
naval dimension of the proliferation is equally important 
especially if the procurement of capable naval weaponry by 
radical authoritarian states is considered.
3.1 The Emerging Naval Military Technologies
Small Combatants And Anti-Ship Missiles
Technological developments of the cold war was centred 
towards the major naval actions, such as global scale power 
projection, amphibious operations, surface engagements with 
major combatants at long ranges. All of these were designed 
for use by major naval powers at high seas. The 'introduction 
of the anti-ship missiles for example gave a chance to surface 
ships ( as well as submarines onto which they were mounted 
later ) to engage their enemy over-the-horizon ranges. The 
anti-ship, anti-aircraft missiles, guided torpedoes have all 
found their way to most major navies of the world, and has 
been used with effect in conflicts.
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The military experience in recent operations such as 
Persian Gulf has shown that the technological edge still 
remains a major battle winning factor. Numerical inferiority 
can be nullified and reversed by superiority in quality. The 
naval dimension of the military technology will also take its 
share from the developments. However the chief benefactor of 
the new developments will be the smaller naval powers.
The concept of a small and capable navy has always been 
favoured by writers on naval strategy for quite a long time. 
This theoretical concept seems to be closer to practice today 
than in any other previous time. Regional conflicts are 
usually made up of naval warfare between states with limited 
resources. Such a war will be conducted with a number of Fast 
Attack Crafts (FAC) and land-based aircraft armed with 
anti-shipping missiles.
These small naval assets were the focus of constant 
technological development for the last few decades. Especially 
anti-ship missiles were upgraded in performance and lethality 
in the last decade.The advent of VLSI - the very large scale 
integration is one of the reasons behind this advance.The 
decreasing size of engine and sensory systems allows missiles 
to penetrate the defence more easily, pack more explosives and 
fly to longer distances with an increased amount of fuel.
After the sinking of the Eilat, anti-ship missiles have 
been watched with caution.Ever since their deployment in the 
navies of Soviet clients, they made United States and NATO 
members quite susceptible to sudden and destructive attacks. 
These missiles, packing onboard target seekers of various 
kinds'“^ carry enough destructive power to cripple and even sink
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a destroyer-sized opponent. The terrible punishment taken by 
the H.M.S. Sheffield and its subsequent abandoning after being 
hit by a single Exocet (which has a far less destructive 
potential than pact-built missiles) well illustrates the 
lethality of these missiles. Today missile technology has 
improved even further and with more advanced targeting 
methods, such as skimming the sea to decrease the chance of 
being detected prematurely, homing on jamming and using dual 
search modes (i.e. using both the infra-red and the radar 
search modes at the same time and comparing the two results) 
their chances of intercepting the targets have risen greatly.
The threat of using anti-ship missiles has been 
considered by the major navies so that all of them reserve 
great amounts of research to find effective counter measures. 
The reason lies in the great worry caused by the deployment of 
these missiles by most of the world's small navies. When 
Libyan naval forces engaged the American navy with the 
intention of driving it out of the Sidra Gulf in 1986, the 
presence of such missile craft gave United States navy a great 
amount of worry. For that reason it kept a constant umbrella 
of aircraft armed with anti-ship weapons to destroy such 
combatants before they come in range to fire their missiles.^"
The development of air-launched anti-ship missiles that 
can be used by many available air platforms and the 
availability of such missiles in the international arms market 
is another important factor that may increase the capability 
of regional and coastal navies. The presence of such weapons 
means that a nation does not need a navy to project naval 
power hundreds of miles from its shores.
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The importance of the countermeasure against anti-ship 
missiles was shown in the lessons of the October 1973 war, 
when Israeli missile boats used manoeuvre, electronic 
countermeasures, and close-in rapid fire guns to defeat the SS 
- 2C missile with success/’ On the other hand, during the 
tanker war in the Persian Gulf, merchant shipping that had no 
countermeasures received 52 hits out of 53 firings/®
The threat that arises from the deployment of highly 
capable new generation anti-ship missiles is actively 
responded to by the use of countermeasures to nullify their 
effects. The emphasis is given on the countermeasures that is 
either aimed at the destruction of the warhead by the close-in 
weapons systems such as the Phalanx system used by the United 
States navy or the more conventional weapon/sensor 
countermeasures employment. Today, the countermeasures against 
anti-ship missiles are very important since the capability of 
such missiles is very advanced so that no captain can hope to 
manoeuvre out of their way as in the 1973 war.
Various means of confusing the guidance head of a missile 
have been tried; electronic jamming, chaff, infrared heat 
signature suppression and even lasers.^® However, missile 
designers usually adapt to these by simple and on the spot 
changes, such as frequency shifting during flight and 
installing multiple sensor options and home-on-jamming 
tactics. Tactical solutions such as using 'cocktails' -single 
salvos containing a variety of missile types also proved to be 
very effective.
At the same time advances in long range propagation and 
navigation systems have enabled introduction of long range
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anti-ship missiles and also giving even the smaller missiles 
an over-the-horizon capability. However such missiles need 
the presence of a targeting capability such as a Remotely 
Piloted Vehicle (RPV), forward observation helicopter, 
aircraft or a satellite other than the launch platform.
New missile boats that are being launched by the navies 
are significantly heavier armed than their predecessors. These 
ships pack enough firepower to cripple the most powerful 
warships of the major navies if they get within range. In 
future battles at sea where the detection range is hindered 
either through the use of jammers or due to environmental 
reasons, they can be very effective.^^
Developments In Submarine Warfare
Diesel electric submarines have been operated only by 
Britain and ex-USSR in the cold war. However, they are now 
making a comeback with the end of the cold war. The 
introduction of new classes such as the Kilo has caused stir 
in the western naval circles since these ships are very hard 
to find and equally hard to sink.^^ The SSKs are also cheaper 
and easier to maintain than their nuclear counterparts. This 
is one of the reasons that the market for SSKs is growing.
Similarly, the performance of diesel-electric submarines 
has improved greatly over the last few decades with the result 
that they are now used by over 40 navies. The advances in 
torpedo weaponry of submarines (torpedoes or anti-ship 
missiles) as well as the latest high capability sonar designs
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have narrowed the quality difference between major navies and 
the smaller ones.
Most diesel-electric submarines are armed with systems 
that enable them to launch anti-ship missiles - such as the 
Harpoons fitted to Hayashio class submarines of the Japanese 
Navy.” Such weaponry in addition to the traditional torpedo 
armament, gives the SSKs an additional stand-off attack 
capability that can enable them to inflict serious damages on 
surface units.
Advances in the machinery of diesel electric submarines 
give them more endurance. The diesel-electric submarines will 
therefore be able to operate for longer periods in the sea 
without refuelling. The increase in the range and endurance of 
such submarines also means that they will now be better 
adapted to stalking the SLOCs in times of war. They can lie 
low in the 'choke' points of shipping, as demonstrated during 
World War II when American and German submarines had inflicted 
catastrophic losses despite technologic inferiority.
These improvements in the capabilities of submarines will 
be important. Acting independently in World War II style, with 
enough missile-armed submarines led by an adequate targeting 
information network, even a small navy could destroy or 
seriously damage the naval forces of a neighbouring small 
power at their base.
Advanced submarines are potent threats even as individual 
units. Only tv/o to six are likely to be operated by current 
and future small-but-capable navies. While it is clear that 
such a small submarine force probably cannot deny the use of
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regional seas, they may be a constant source of harassment and 
minor attrition and draw larger forces to neutralize them.
The relative cheapness of SSKs compared to the other 
submarine platforms will greatly facilitate obtaining such 
ships for regional and coastal navies such ships for. The 
improvements in the performance and the capability of these 
ships will definitely make an influential addition to the 
capability of coastal and regional navies.
Protection Against Air Threats
The contest between the aircraft and the ship has gone on 
since the early days of the century.. However, the advent of 
the air launched anti-ship missile has led navies to install 
systems that can eliminate attacking aircraft before it can 
launch missiles. At the same time similar systems that can 
destroy missile barrages ( in the case of a probable clash 
with aircraft such as the Backfire that has very long range 
anti-ship missiles) have also been developed by navies.
The development of such systems such as the American 
Aegis missile and aircraft combat system increased the 
survivability of, surface groups operating against an enemy 
supplied with naval strike aircraft to some extent. However 
the price of these systems is so high that only crude versions 
of such management systems remain in the purchasing power of 
the medium navies.
Today, air forces are generally devoted to support 
operations on land but are available to fly naval missions if
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the need arises. The capabilities of modern aircraft allow 
such multi-functional air forces. The air forces have grown in 
effectiveness even when they are handled by the Third World 
powers with limited servicing facilities and operational 
experience. This was demonstrated in the naval engagements of 
the Falkland and Gulf War where it was found that Third World 
states can effectively penetrate the anti-aircraft screens of 
the major navies.
Therefore air power will remain as one of the chief 
disadvantages of conducting naval operations under enemy 
controlled skies. Naval ability to cope effectively with the 
air threats still needs development. Despite the claims of the 
defence manufacturers about the effectiveness of their 
anti-aircraft weapons, the extra caution shown by the navies 
is an important indicator of this.
3.2 The Increasing Availability Of Technological 
Sophistication
The technological sophistication of weapons in the naval 
strategic environment will favour the regional and the coastal 
navies. This is because the developments in the military 
technology increase their powers relative to the major navies. 
As FACs and their related munitions become more sophisticated, 
their unit effectiveness increase considerably.”
Especially as the further development of compact systems 
and subsystems progress, even increasing amounts of 
microelectronics and vertical-launch weapon modules will be
41
placed in small ships. Automation can also help reducing the 
crew size and therefore the living space requirements by 
taking over the jobs done by the personnel and eliminating the 
need for their presence. The space gained by this decrease is 
also used to give the ships more sensory systems and 
ammunition load. These developments can be best visualized in 
the following example; a 550 tonne Reshef III class Israeli 
Fast Attack Craft is handled by the same number of personnel 
as a Komar I class missile boat of 1960s design which is in 
the 200 tonne class. However, Reshef Ills can carry up to 14 
medium to long range SSMs, an on-board helicopter for ASW/ASuW 
operations and have an extensive sensory kit while Komar was 
designed to carry only two of the inferior Styx medium range 
missiles and a very crude radar set.^ ®
The overall effect of these trends will be the enhanced 
capability of individual units, increased size and 
sophistication of weapons and platforms and therefore much 
more capable forces even for small sized forces.
The technological developments in the naval military will 
greatly improve the regional and the coastal navies which have 
been deprived of such capable equipment in the course of the 
cold war. Especially the proliferation described above is an 
important factor in the procurement of such systems by the 
navies of lesser states.
The proliferation of high technology military products 
has been a major concern for the international community for 
the last few decades. The naval dimension of the subject is 
equally important and the consequences also pose a threat to 
the security of the maritime activities.
42
The proliferation of conventional technologies increased 
with the dissolution of the political blocs. This led to an 
increase on the constraints exercised for the diffusion of 
weapons technologies that may affect the balance of power. The 
reflections of this development were made apparent in the Gulf 
War, when Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighters began attacking 
merchantmen in the Gulf with Exocet missiles. These weapons, 
which were examples of high western technology began to find 
their way into the armouries of the Third World naval powers.
In 1983, less than 40 countries operated missile armed 
ships or submarines. By the early 1990s, the number had 
reached to over 70.” This almost twofold increase in the 
number is due to the extensive military purchases made by 
countries. The tendency to arm with modern weapons was fuelled 
by two other factors: first, the entry of lower priced models 
of these weapons, especially from countries with expanding 
military industries such as Israel, China and Sweden. These 
countries with some of the western ones which have extensive 
arms-trading potential such as France, have sold many 
anti-shipping missiles in the period. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy example is the selling of Chinese and French 
anti-ship missiles to Iran and Iraq in the Gulf war.
The cutdown prices for the crude versions of high 
technology weapons is a lucrative market. Today many potential 
buyers for such weapons exist. After all, even a small navy 
would like to buy an inaccurate but nevertheless threatening 
anti-ship missile rather than relying on more traditional 
methods which it has far less chance to inflict damage.
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The factor of chain reaction effect for armament must 
also be taken into account. When one country makes a military 
equipment purchase, its neighbours, especially if they have 
some suspicions about the intentions of that state will desire 
to counter this development by acquiring a similar weapon 
system. If the heavily arming Gulf states and some other 
regional navies are considered, it is clear that the arms race 
in the naval dimension is slowly gathering speed.
Another factor is the increased number of countries that 
have the capability to manufacture such SSMs. Especially 
China, Argentina and South Africa advanced their anti-shipping 
missile capabilities in the last 20 years. It deserves mention 
that of this group, especially China became a major SSM 
supplier to Third World navies.
At the same period, these countries also managed to 
introduce other types of naval weapon systems for 
anti-aircraft defences, IC" systems, sensory systems and home 
designed and built naval platforms. These technical 
capabilities, gained by those countries act as the basis of 
their regional naval powers.
China and India are good examples for illustrating the 
development of such capabilities.^® China has developed its 
SSBN capability and launched its first SSBN in the early 
1980s. She already deploys some 5 SSNs and builds her own Luta 
class DDGs that have blue water performance.®“ China plans to 
deploy an aircraft carrier before the end of the century.®^ 
India also shows similar advances in naval technology. Today 
the Indian navy has managed to deploy onboard systems for AA 
warfare. She is currently believed to be in the process of
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completing the final plans to deploy AA missiles on her 
warships.
The chief benefactors of the increased proliferation in 
the naval dimension are the navies of small and medium level 
states. Those have been excluded from the luxury of high 
capability weapons in the cold war. However, they are now in a 
position to get such equipment. The proliferation will change 
the balance of technology in favour of those navies.
3.3 Developments In Military Technology And Naval Missions
Advances in the military technology favour small and 
medium navies, because of the increasing conventional 
framework of the naval strategic environment and at the same 
tim.e its increasing availability to all navies at the same 
time. The disappearance of the nuclear mission from the 
agendas of the major navies and their former classification to 
fight a battle at high sea, put them at a disadvantage when 
fighting within enclosed and bounded areas of the sea. The 
improvement in conventional technologies also makes possible 
for regional navies to deploy more capable ships in covering 
positions. This can offer a significant advantage in attacks 
against bigger sized opponents and in rapid deployment of 
limited numbers of units on successive missions within a large 
combat zone.
The major navies have long enjoyed a qualitative as well 
as a quantitative advantage. Besides they already employ most 
of these technologies. The effects of the increasing
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availability and increased conventional capabilities will be 
more visible in the coastal and regional navies. The 
increasing capabilities of such navies will enable them to be 
used to support land operations in a limited way, to help in 
supply and logistics, and interdict similar operations or 
commercial use of local seas by the enemy. The task of small 
navies is generally based on establishing the local sea 
control. This may be limited in the coverage of the area but 
will not be restricted by a time period. They will also be 
tasked with the elimination of the enemy naval threat, and 
neutralising the air threats and submarines.
The small and medium navies will continue to improve 
their strategic and tactical situation against major ones. The 
first and foremost concern of such navies; the threat of a 
bigger naval power is now no longer considered as a serious 
danger as it used to be in the past. The problem of 
eliminating the surface threat, a major element of sea control 
is now in a better position to be solved. As described above 
the increasing firepower of small navies now gives them a 
better chance to deal with such adversaries. While larger 
navies rely upon their fleet of major warships ( and quite 
often upon their sea-based air force ), small navies enjoy the 
advantage of land based strike aviation that is far better 
equipped than in the past. It can provide semi- or at least 
partial coverage of maritime areas they want to control.
The decisive battle will be the primary objective of such 
small navies against similar sized opponents. After the 
initiation of hostilities, in order to eliminate the potential 
threat of the enemy's surface combatants or weaken his resolve
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a direct and primary clash will most probably be sought by 
these naval forces.
On the other hand, when facing a major naval power 
regional and coastal navies may opt to 'lie low' and use the 
time-honoured 'fleet-in-being' strategy to threaten a flanking 
attack on the naval forces of the adversary. The targets may 
be coastal cities, or precious SLOCs. Without offering an 
opportunity to be defeated at sea by the other side they can 
harass the major enemy resources. One way that can be used by 
the major navies to counter such a strategy is to perform 
pre-emptive strikes from land or sea based aircraft and cruise 
missiles.
In the light of the developments presented so far, the 
following developments in the nature of future naval missions 
can be predicted :
a) Combined air-surface tactics will be exercised to 
maximise lethality.
b) The strategy of choice will either be built around 
pre-emptive air strikes or forcing decisive naval 
engagements rather than facing a prolonged war at sea;
c) Denial of the control of a particular area will be a much 
favoured option especially since most nations now have a 
submarine ability. These can be used in naval combat 
against SLOCs, enemy bases or 'choke areas' of shipping.
d) Also the time honoured principle of success in combat 
will remain as the tactical innovation and technical 
adjustment given the wide range of operational capability 
of the naval forces.
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Naval power operations reflect the developments in 
military technology. This fact will also remain unchanged in 
the new period. Technological constraints will define the 
limits of naval missions.
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IV GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NEW NAVAL ENVIRONMENT
4 .1 The New Strategic Environment
Karl von Clausewitz defined war as the continuation of 
policy by other means. A noted writer of International 
Politics has extended this definition to define cold war as 
the continuation of war by non-lethal means. During the cold 
war opposing fleets quietly watched each other's moves and 
tried to match them. Each navy pursued a grand strategy 
dictated by the conditions of the cold war. Strategies of 
these sea pov/ers v/ere directly effective on the type of the 
missions carried out.
Strategies are not devised without any motives, policies 
drive them. Policies in turn, are based on the prevailing 
strategic environment. The conditions of the maritime 
environment have apparently changed quite radically in the 
last decade. The cold war, which began in the late 1940s, has 
ended with the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration 
of the USSR.
The conditions defining the missions of the sea power in 
that era have also come to an end. There are no longer two 
fleets that closely try to monitor and match the opposite 
side's move. They do not prepare any more for the day they 
will confront each other. The disappearance of one of the main
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elements of the cold war sea environment will inevitably 
change the nature of the naval strategy in this new era.
The developments that have taken place in the last decade 
produced an entirely new strategic setting. After almost half 
a century of political combat and some minor proxy military 
skirmishes, the cold war has come to an end. Changes that 
could only have been imagined by the most liberal thinkers 
have led to the break-up of one of the superpowers.
The most acclaimed growth of regional navies has been in 
the East. Spurred by the perception that the United States is 
leaving the Far East, Asian navies seem to be in a period of 
speedy expansion. True to the Mahanian approach, the rise of 
the trade in especially the south east of the region also 
fuelled such attempts by the states to increase the 
capabilities of their navies. Japan's Naval Self-Defence Force 
has been transformed into the sixth powerful fleet in the 
world v/ith more surface ships than the British Royal Navy. It 
has ordered a V/STOL carrier for delivery in 2000 as well as 
additional Aegis destroyers.“ The Chinese navy is building 
progressively a blue water fleet. Its fleet of destroyers is 
making increasingly longer journeys. There is also the 
possibility of purchasing a carrier, probably the Varyag from 
the Russian Federation. In the Indian Ocean, the Indian naval 
force built around two light carriers, six submarines, and 
bases in the Maldives and Tanzania shows the same trends of 
expansion.
The rise of the naval powers of authoritarian states and 
politically unstable states such as Iran, Algeria and Libya in 
the Mediterranean rim and the Gulf also deserve attention.
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These states border the most vital SLOCs in the world. Their 
authoritarian regimes have initiated extensive armament 
efforts. Even now they have a more than enough capability to 
threaten these SLOCs. Only a few of the major navies can 
operate in those areas and keep the SLOCs open against the 
possible attacks of these countries.
Another newcomer into the great naval power club is the 
European Navy. If realized, Europe's "Maritime Concept 2010" 
will allow the European Union to assemble a naval force of 30 
nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines and 70 modern 
diesel-electric submarines, 8 small carriers, over 100 
destroyers and frigate sized ships, by the end of this 
century.While there is no reason to think that the European 
naval forces will pursue an aggressive motive, nevertheless it 
will support a growing self-confidence and assertiveness in 
naval matters by Europe.®^ This may result in the widening of 
the differences between United States' and European views on 
some naval issues.
4.2 Withdrawal Of The Soviet Navy
The outcome of the cold war was a victory for the West. 
This transition, from a bipolar international system to a 
unipolar one also affected the naval strategic thinking which 
was based on the mutual competition of the two sides on the 
oceans of the world for the last several years.
As the Soviet power left Europe, the Soviet navy also 
gradually ceased to perform many of its cold war functions and
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duties. The Ex-USSR is now being transformed into a new group 
of states as a result of political, ethnic and national 
conflicts, and economic distress. It is quite doubtful that 
any of the new republics, even including the Russian 
Federation will appear as a new global military superpower.
The naval environment is also affected by this sudden 
decline in Soviet military power. There are 'cavities of 
power' similar to those created in the central and eastern 
Europe after Soviet troops have left.
However the two withdrawals are not entirely the same. 
Though they both signal the exit of the USSR from a superpower 
position, the naval withdrawal of the USSR or its remains will 
be completed in a longer period of time, its consequences will 
also take longer to take effect. The naval assets of the 
Soviet navy will continue to decrease, including the massive 
nuclear armoury. A large navy is actually an expensive 
hardware investment, something which the CIS states will 
probably not desire and can not afford to keep, given the 
present condition of their economies.
Naval forces will probably be the first thing that will 
be on the disposal list since maintenance of naval units is 
expensive as compared to the other military units. The 
withdrawal of these assets will come in stages as the economic 
decline forces the CIS to dispose of these now unwanted 
hardware. The voluntary phasing out of these units, generally 
seen as an offensive tool of war will also positively affect 
the western opinion on which so much depends in the form of 
economic aids for the reforms.
52
Another point that will seal the fate of the remains of 
the former Soviet Navy is its minimal strategic value to 
Russia, a traditional land power. As a branch of the military 
forces that is redundant and has a less cost-benefit ratio 
when compared to other services, the Russian navy will be the 
first branch that will be compromised when the need arises to 
cut the budget deficit. Indeed the time must have come for 
such a deletion of unwanted assets in the former USSR navy, 
especially if one considers the enormous economical problems 
of Russia.
The withdrawal of ex-USSR naval units from the oceans of 
the world will be gradual. The units of its navy still 
outnumber all other naval fleets except that of America. If 
one also considers that ships built in the 1950s and 1960s are 
nearing their operational life and are due for block 
deletions, it will be evident that the Russian fleet will 
retain a much diminished proportion of the ex-USSR navy. It 
will, hov/ever, probably take a long time before full decline 
of this massive naval power becomes complete.
A decline in the power projection capability and the 
number of 'flags shown' which is central to a superpower 
military potential, will come as the first signal of the 
USSR's naval withdrawal. Those capabilities that are dependent 
on the presence of military staging bases ( which may be fixed 
or floating) in the appropriate locations of the world. The 
Soviet Navy depended on her naval bases to a greater extent 
than other naval powers since it lacked a capable aircraft 
carrier force and extensive mobile logistic support system to 
back up her operations.®^ The evacuation of the former Soviet
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owned bases in the various locations of the world will result 
in growing difficulties for its inheritors to maintain their 
naval presence and carry out similar operations.
The former Soviet union maintained a number of bases in 
parts of the world. Dispersed in the territories of the USSR 
clients, the presence of these bases gave the Soviets the 
opportunity to pursue their strategy of backing Third World 
struggles. The consequence of the evacuation of these bases 
will be the ensuing vacuum of power in those areas where 
previously the Soviet navy has projected its presence.
American and allied counter-Soviet naval concentration 
will also decrease in number and strength since they are now 
redundant. Their meaning of existence; the offsetting of 
Soviet influence has now faded away. This is another outcome 
of the withdrawal that further enlarges the ensuing military 
vacuum.
The present leadership of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States has claimed that it poses no threat to the United 
States. Yet the CIS still possesses some 27, 000 warheads, an 
armoury that cannot be ignored, especially in light of the 
continuing instability in the former Soviet Union. The 
Russian-led Commonwealth's military forces remain potentially 
formidable. It can still field the second most powerful naval 
power on the globe and the navy still deploys thousands of 
these nuclear warheads aboard its SSBNs.
Moreover, the Commonwealth will decide to disengage 
slowly. They still have interests which diverge from the 
western interests in Black Sea, Southeast Asia and other parts 
of the world. The ideological aspect of the cold war may in
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fact have been terminated, but the geopolitical aspect will 
only gradually exit the scene.
Indeed the problem that flared between the Ukraine and 
Russia about the Black Sea fleet is an example for this. While 
admitting that the fleet is burden for the stagnated economy, 
Russia has spent much political effort and economic 
arm-twisting to retain a larger share of the Black Sea Fleet 
and also to retain the important naval base of the Novorosisk.
The vanishing of Soviet power from those areas may have 
variable after effects. While in those regions where no 
capable sea power to fill the vacuum exists, the 
extra-regional factors will come to take place, but regional 
powers will compete with each other to gain the supreme 
position in other areas. One such region is the Indian Ocean 
where the Indian navy is rising very fast to fill the vacuum 
left by the decline of the superpower rivalry.
4.3 The Changing Naval Balance Of Power In The Indian 
Ocean
India 's Quest For Supremacy
The withdrawal of superpower presence from the Indian 
Ocean is likely to cause intense struggle between the powers 
of the region. The intra-regional conflicts between the powers 
of the region that have largely remained unresolved because of 
the cold war can now be pursued by all sides, now that there
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are no superpower fleets watching over their shoulders, ready 
to intervene if one side goes too far.®’
The capability of the Indian navy was highlighted in the 
conflicts with Pakistan. During the operations against the 
Karachi and Chittagong the Indian navy managed to suppress 
Pakistani naval resistance.®®
Currently India operates about forty-five combatants in 
her navy which makes her the largest navy in the Indian 
Ocean.®® The steady increase in her naval capabilities since 
1960s has made her the leading sea power in the region. It 
deserves mentioning that India plans further expansion in her 
naval force such as the home built versions of ships that it 
now operates.’®
The importance of its naval power becomes more meaningful 
when India's unique geopolitical position in the Indian Ocean 
is taken into account. A quick glance at a map reveals that 
the Indian subcontinent cuts the Indian Ocean into two parts: 
the Arabian Sea and the Bengal Bay. India enjoys an interior 
lines advantage. Located in a central position, India can 
exert its influence on the events emanating from both of the 
regions that involve not only local powers but also major 
extra-regional powers.”
Reactions From Extra And Intra-Reglonal Sources
The Indian Ocean comprises a large part of the developing 
world. Excluding India, there are no major powers in the 
region but 36 littoral and 11 hinterland states, most of which
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are non-aligned. It is a large pool of cultural, political and 
religious diversity. Therefore the formation of a solid 
aligned bloc consisting of the regional countries against 
India will not be easy. So far only a number of border 
skirmishes with China and two wars with Pakistan in which she 
emerged victorious, were the only armed resistance shown to 
India.
India's quest for a superior position in the Indian Ocean 
may be received warmly by some extra-regional powers such as 
the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom 
is a traditional ally of India and supplied her with 
sophisticated weaponry throughout the cold war period. Britain 
sold the Indian Navy its second aircraft carrier and agreed to 
help its reconditioning operations on older ships. Britain 
will probably continue to support India as a factor of 
stability in the region.
The same notions are perhaps also maintained by the 
United States. After the end of the Afghan War, the value of 
Pakistan gradually diminished. Pakistani efforts to build 
nuclear weapons are viewed as a direct threat to regional 
stability. As the American-Pakistani relationship slowly 
turned sour,^^ American officials sought a rapprochement with 
India. In a meeting with the Indian officials in New Delhi, 
1991, American officials discussed the future possibilities of 
co-operation in the region for keeping the stability. One year 
later two Indian destroyers took part in a joint exercise with 
United States forces in the first of a number of similar
exercises.73
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India is viewed as the integral factor for stability by 
outside forces. Therefore its expansion in the naval
I
environment may be tolerated and even be backed by those 
powers as described above.
On the other hand, regional competitors may rise to rival 
India. The most probable candidate is Pakistan; which fought 
two wars with India. Barred from the three sides by 
inefficient and dependent on a non-sophisticated road 
transport system, Pakistan depends on her sea lines to get 
necessary imports to support and sustain her economy. Pakistan 
underwent a very efficient blockade during the wars with 
India. In order not to let anything like this happen again 
Pakistan has embarked on a strategy of sea denial of the 
critical areas in her territorial waters to Indian naval 
threat.
Increasing power projection capability of the Indian navy 
is another reason for states in the region to worry about 
Indian naval power. Despite its limitedness such a power may 
back up allied movements to the Indian cause in the Indian 
Ocean region (which is so much in abundance) tilting the 
balance of power to its advantage. No state is free from 
internal disturbances in the region. The présence of a force 
that intervenes on the behalf of anti-government groups only 
makes life more difficult for the region's nations. Therefore 
the states of the region may step up to offset this potential 
of the Indian navy.
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The Indian Ocean is one of the most likely places that a 
new naval balance of power will emerge in the coming decade. 
Under the light of the above observations, a dominance of 
littoral aspects in these new power formulations in which the 
regional powers, rather than then the extra-regional ones will 
be the elements, can be predicted.
India will use her naval strength to impose its influence 
in the region to enjoy a larger slice of the natural resources 
of the Indian Ocean. But the real objective of the Indian navy 
will remain the security of the SLOCs coming to India as it is 
dependent on these very important lines for her economy.
India, with her expanding naval power lies at the heart 
of any setting for the new naval environm.ent. Other states in 
the region will not actually welcome the idea of the Indian 
Navy showing its presence in their troubled backyards or 
patrolling in their sea lines of communications. On the other 
hand India is viewed as the main element of stability in the 
post-cold war period in the region by the outsiders. With all 
these factors ranged against each other in the equilibrium 
Indian Ocean will certainly witness an arms race and high 
tension politics that will make it one of the most volatile 
sea areas after the cold war.
The Future Of Naval Balance In The Indian Ocean
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The Pacific was undoubtedly one of the most important 
'backyards' in the cold war^ .^ It was where a silent tug-of-war 
of countering the other side's moves was conducted throughout 
the cold war. Today, the Soviet Far Eastern fleet lies in a 
state of neglect in its ports. News of ships and machinery 
from the fleet being dismantled by the crews to be sold are 
commonplace.’® As the decline of the ex-Soviet naval power 
becomes more complete in the Pacific, new players will emerge 
to balance the western side of the equilibrium. China with its 
combination of geographical location, industrial base and an 
ambitious naval expansion program will inevitably be the first 
candidate for study.
Chinese Naval Power Expansion.
China managed to sustain an impressive growth rate in the 
last decade.” China's intentions to parallel this economic 
growth with a similar expansion in its military capabilities 
are testified by its accelerated efforts to modernise its 
armed forces. This new logic is different than the previously 
formulated ones being based on a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative basis.
Chinese naval strength has increased significantly with 
the addition of several new classes and numbers of ships, each 
one much more capable than the older ones. The rate of 
introduction of these new classes increased especially after
4.4 Southeast Pacific
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the lessons of the Gulf War where the technological 
superiority prevailed over the numeric one.’®
This naval force accumulation of China signals the 
Chinese aims to be the leading regional naval power; a 
position that is now vacant after the Soviet departure from 
the Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. China's security considerations 
are increasingly regional. The littoral inclination in the 
Chinese naval planning is also emphasized by its improving 
economy making China more sensitive than ever about its sea 
links. The improving Sino-Russian relationship on the other 
hand, affects the Chinese naval planners to shift their plans 
from full major conflicts in the Northern parts to smaller 
skirmishes in the Southern areas.
With its mountainous borders in the Southeast region 
making it quite hard for China to exert its numerical 
superiority,’® China will seek future engagements in media that 
are more favourable to itself. The Chinese air force can not 
constitute a serious threat to the regional states. Many of 
the aircraft in the Chinese Airforce inventory are crude 
copies of USSR aircraft such as MiG-21,Su-27 and 11-28.®° These 
outdated aircraft have limited payload and range, and also 
suffer from a lack of suitable avionics that is required for 
operations in hostile environments. They can not be expected 
to survive in the face of even moderately effective air 
defence systems. On the other hand, most of China's neighbours 
such as Thailand, Taiwan and even Vietnam have extensive 
national anti-aircraft defences. The naval force therefore 
remains as the only alternative where China can exert its 
superiority in numbers and technology against its neighbours.®*
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The Chinese naval strategy formulated after the 
revolution was based on a version of Maoist Peoples' War At 
Sea. It envisaged the support of land forces by naval 
extension charged with the mission of denying the coastal 
areas to the enemy invasion forces. The Chinese strategy is 
now changing; beginning in the 1980s the value of modern 
fighting vessels in present time naval environment became 
apparent to the Chinese naval leaders. More ships of modern 
designs are now replacing those acquired in the late 1950s and 
1960s or built domestically with Soviet know-how. The primary 
motive of this doctrine seems to be the neutralisation of 
possible Russian amphibious operations against the northern 
parts of the country.®^
It seems that China will increase its naval strength and 
capability to engage in naval operations in increasing 
distances from her shores.®“* The operation extensions were 
viewed by the western authors as more than training 
exercises.®^ They have demonstrated that the Chinese navy can 
manage the complex problems of long cruises, at-sea fuelling 
and communications over long distances.
With the improving Sino-Soviet and later Sino-Russian 
relations a shift of focus from northern waters to the south 
occurred. Additionally the Peoples' Liberation Navy (PLN) now 
enjoys a steady flow of sophisticated Russian naval 
technology. As stated by a writer, China has entered a new 
phase in her development plans to gain more hi-tech goods and 
not being constrained by the political factors.®® It deserves 
mentioning that China also sent some naval cadets to the
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Russian Pacific fleet to get more information on the handling 
of the carriers.
Chinese naval circles have begun to formulate more 
assertive naval strategies. The extension of the " coastal 
area " to either 200 km or the continental shelf, whichever is 
longer, clearly shows the drastic change in the logic of 
Chinese naval planners. Recently this expansionist motives 
were highlighted by a Chinese general as
" in order to prevent China from being attacked from 
sea, it's necessary to extend the depth of defence 
in to the oceans and to have a naval capability of 
intercepting and destroying enemy far out
Paralleling the expansion theme, there is a growing 
interest in operations in the southern waters. The expanding 
capabilities of the navy make it more possible to stage 
longer-duration operations at sea which is prerequisite for
• · 83power projection.
It should be noted that China's naval power is already 
the most powerful in the region. This will make the Chinese 
more eager to deploy their naval power in the Southeast for 
"showing the flag". A three-stage naval expansion program 
outlines the ideas of Chinese naval planners,· the first stage 
till the year 2000 sees the introduction of major surface 
combatants with advanced electronics; in phase 2, between 2000 
and 2020 several small carriers will be built, as the embryo 
of the future task forces, which would appear in the last 
stage of the program. By 2040, China would be able to conduct 
naval operations anywhere in the world.
It deserves mention that this plan may even have already 
been activated. Visits have been made to the ex-Soviet Fleet
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by the Chinese officers in order to gain more experience in 
the handling of long range operations and also operating 
aircraft at sea. PLN also has revealed a plan calling for the 
training of about 100 naval pilots to operate ship borne 
planes before 1997.
Beijing's efforts to build up its naval forces directly 
stem from the strategic environment that now prevails. The 
decline of the Soviet naval power motivates Chinese naval 
planners to be more assertive in the projection of naval 
power. Another important factor is the withdrawal of United 
States presence from this region of the Pacific. In 1992, the 
United States navy and Marine Corps left their largest base, 
the Cubic Bay in Philippines. After its liberation in 1944, 
the Cubic Bay harboured a large part of the United States 
navy. It had a number of dockyards, big enough to take in 
large ships, storage areas for fuel and weapons. There is no 
other base that gives the same level of support to the United 
States navy nearer than Oahu. The United States Marine Corps 
is also leaving the region; some part is going to Diego Garcia 
in Indian Ocean, and the rest to San Diego on the East Coast. 
The withdrawal of the Marine Corps means that a swift 
deployment to the region as in Korea and Vietna:m Wars are now 
out of question.
The withdrawal of the United States and Soviet naval 
might from South Pacific leaves China as the most dominant 
land and sea power in the region today. China will make use of 
its navy to expand its influence in the region. It must be 
expected that Chinese ships will perform active resource 
management and safeguarding missions. Especially after the
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skirmishes with the Vietnam over the Spratsly Islands in the 
last decade, the Chinese navy shows a keen interest in such 
missions. Considering the volume of natural resources of the 
region such conflicts in which China will be the chief naval 
actor must be expected.
However, in the not-so-distant future China may run into 
another rival; Japan. Japan currently has one of the most 
modern navies in the world. Her economic superpower status has 
enabled Japan to have a strong industrial base in the world.
So far Japan has refrained from flexing this economic muscle. 
However, it may not and probably will not pursue this policy 
forever. Especially in the last few years Japanese leaders 
showed a marked tendency to play a more assertive role in 
Asian politics.Similarly, Japan may feel that time has come 
for her to step back into her place in Asian politics. 
Traditionally a sea-going state, and with a well demonstrated 
ability for naval capability, Japan v/ill surely modify its 
naval strategy. This may call for a western and southern 
expansion in its naval area of operations. In that case Japan 
is bound to step into the sphere of Chinese influence.
Littorality plays the main theme in the South Pacific.
The exit of the ex-Soviet Union in the Pacific, as well as 
that of the United States navy and marines, left China with 
her growing naval capabilities as the most possible candidate 
for the mystery of the Region. Aided by her relatively 
modernised navy and airforce China may take the supreme place. 
However, it will not be long before Japan emerges as a 
military, as well as an economic power. In that situation, 
however, friction may appear as a result of the rivalry for
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the influence over the sea areas in the region that is rich 
with natural resources.
4.5 The Middle East And Instability
Medlterransan Sea
The Mediterranean meets at the connection of three 
continents on which the first advanced civilizations appeared. 
For many centuries, the water ways in the region were the most 
important routes for goods, culture and invading armies. Its 
importance has not declined today, on the contrary it may even 
be said that it has increased.
NATO and Warsaw Pact maintained large numbers of naval 
units in the Mediterranean. With the end of the cold war, the 
Soviet presence or the remnants of it gradually left the 
Mediterranean. The stability formed by the balance of naval 
power between the evenly matched presence of two superpowers 
has slowly left in its place a one sided presence by the 
United States and its allies. However the exit of the Soviet 
presence from the Mediterranean also signals the elimination 
of constraints that held back third parties from actively 
pursuing their own objectives.
Before going on to explore the possible outcome that may 
emerge in a relatively less constrained environment, it may be 
useful to remember the unique geographical position of the 
Mediterranean. It may be viewed as a long sea way that extends
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from the east to the west. Along the east-west direction some 
islands such as Malta,' and Cyprus which have a significant 
role and presence in the surrounding sea routes, are present.
These properties force the Mediterranean SLOCs to 
concentrate along specific routes rather than being dispersed. 
This increases the vulnerability of SLOCs in the region. 
Another point that must be stated is that the maximum distance 
between the North and South shores is less than the 
operational range of most striking aircraft. It would not be 
incorrect to assume that a naval group operating in the 
Mediterranean would not be out of distance for a belligerent 
naval strike. This point becomes more obvious if the presence 
of long and medium range strike and bomber planes in the 
inventories of some ex-Soviet clients is remembered. The 
shallowness and warmth of the water also affect the chances of 
detection of a possible underwater target. The shallow waters 
of the Mediterranean greatly deteriorates the detection ranges 
of underwater objects. Therefore the Mediterranean is quite 
favourable to the offensive use of submarines even if they are 
of older designs.
While similar conditions exist in other seas, the 
particular importance of the conditions described above 
appears when Europe's extent of dependency on the 
Mediterranean SLOCs is considered. Mediterranean SLOCs, by the 
nature of geographical conditions, are saturated along a few 
routes and the majority of the merchant marine that enters 
Mediterranean follow these few lines. The grouping of maximum 
numbers of ships increases their vulnerability to harassing
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attacks and aids aggressors in engaging the maximum number of 
targets at one time.
The importance of the Mediterranean to Europe is vital as 
almost all of the imported oil comes through the 
Mediterranean. The opening of the new oil and gas pipelines 
from Baku further multiplies the importance of the 
Mediterranean route. During a possible crisis the cutting of 
this route can prove to be very costly as exemplified by 
Nasser's closure of the Suez.
The rise of radical Islam in North Africa disturbs 
Western states, especially in those that have a shore line in 
the Mediterranean. The emergence of anti-Western regimes may 
seriously undermine the stability of the region. The rise of 
such regimes will greatly impair the prospects of a Middle 
East peace process since the anti-Israeli position of 
fundamentalist Islam makes no compromises for the building of 
a peace v/ith Israel. Sides who oppose the peace process in the 
region such as radical terrorist groups will likely benefit 
from the emergence of such states since they can make use of 
such states as safe havens. Various forms of hostile reactions 
by terrorists operating against Western and secular states of 
the region may’ be launched. The presence of a direct line of 
support available to terrorist groups in the Mediterranean 
will greatly solve logistical support problems and provide 
them shelters from jurisdiction and persecution.
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The Persian Gulf is one of the most important sea areas 
of the world. The reason for this lies in the fact that SLOCs 
that carry the world's most precious energy source pass 
through this area. Over 70 % of the world's oil passes through 
the Gulf SLOCs. The area is a center of strategic interest 
since it has also been the center of political and military 
instability especially in the last decade.
During the cold war, superpower rivalry in the Gulf was 
present. However, the United States presence in both political 
and military terms was much more dominating than the USSR. 
Therefore it wouldn't be wrong to state that Soviet influence 
in the region was limited to the few clients it had, none of 
which carried much political weight until the recent times.
The US naval presence in the Gulf was limited during the 
cold war. This was perhaps due to the non-existence of the 
Soviet navy in the region. However, with radical developments 
in the region both superpowers showed a tendency to deploy 
more and more ships. During the hostage crisis of 1980, United 
States deployed a whole carrier battle group, and the Soviet 
navy had about 20 combatants of all sorts. The ensuing crisis 
and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war made the presence of these 
groups permanent.
The economic importance of the Gulf can be visualized if 
it's remembered that over 60 % of all the oil shipment 
originates from the region. Besides the Gulf also has the
Persian Gulf
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largest oil reserves in the world. The lack of land pipelines 
limit the means of transportation to the maritime lines.
Similarly the geographical conditions of the Persian Gulf 
are also favourable to a potential aggressor which intends to 
cut the SLOCs. The short distance between the coastlines limit 
the passage of the ships to a very constrained area. In a 
matter of a few square miles many ships can be observed to be 
in transit to their destinations. This greatly eases the task 
of a navy trying to perform sea-denial missions. As vividly 
exemplified in the Iran-Iraq war even the use of sparsely sown 
or floating mines can seriously hinder the passage of shipping 
and require a far more amount of effort to clear than to place 
them.
On the other hand the closeness of the coastline also 
deteriorate the sensory systems, limiting their performance 
even in the calmest of the weathers. Therefore it is equally 
difficult to form an effective early warning system in the 
area. The territorial closed waters favour the attackers.
The Rise Of Iranian N a w
After the liberation of Kuwait, all the states in the 
region began to equip themselves with modern weapons of 
various types. However, Iran differs from the rest of the 
states as the foremost naval equipment buyer in the region.®^ 
Its military purchases are of great significance since this 
state used its limited air and naval capabilities to intercept 
international maritime SLOCs during the Iran-Iraq war.^° Even 
with limited capability weapons and equally limited delivery
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platforms, Iran was able to hit more than 139 ships during the
97war.
Iran is trying to acquire sophisticated air and naval 
units, weapons and sensory systems. The deployment of those 
systems will give Iran an increased capability to exert 
pressure on the SLOCs passing through the region. Such 
attempts have been made by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. 
Using strike aviation and land based anti-ship missiles, Iran 
and Iraq attacked a large number of merchant ships and 
tankers.
The current Iranian naval strength includes two 
destroyers and a number of missile armed small, fast 
corvette/frigate sized units.®® Despite their poor sea-going 
performance such vessels can operate successfully in the 
shallow water, their small size making them particularly 
invisible to radar except at close ranges.®® It is noteworthy 
that in the last few years Iran has managed to mount the 
Chinese made C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles in most of its 
naval units.^°° On the other hand Iran is credited with having 
considerable amphibious assets. They indicate the importance 
given by Iran to naval amphibious operations. In the Iraq-Iran 
v/ar, Iran undertook such operations to outflank the Iraqi 
positions in the southern front. Especially in the taking of 
the Al-Faw, Iranian operation took the distinctive shape of 
amphibious landings with initial coverage fire.^ ®^  Today, Iran 
deploys some 30 small to medium size large landing ships and 
about fifty small patrol craft.This gave Iran the ability 
to deploy a brigade of troops in an amphibious assault which 
is an impressive number for a country like Iran. Iran retains
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an ability to supply its fighting forces at sea since, it 
acquired a number of replenishment, fleet supply and one 
repair ship. The total number of support vessels amount to an 
impressive number of about 20 or more tankers, tenders and 
utility craft.
Iran suffered from acute maintenance problems for its 
naval assets during the Iraqi war.^ °^  Therefore Iran is now 
taking important steps to ensure combat readiness in its naval 
forces such as holding regular training sessions for technical 
personnel. Additionally, North Korea, Russia and China provide 
courses for training and maintenance of the equipment they 
provide to Iranian naval personnel.
Iran also seeks naval sensor systems such as airborne 
reconnaissance platforms and long range naval radars.The 
acquisition of such systems will significantly increase Iran's 
long range targeting capability for its strike aircraft, 
submarines and surface units with stand-off missiles.
Iran is expanding its navy with impressive arms 
purchases. According to some sources, Iran has also sought 
more advanced anti-ship missiles from North Korea and China. 
Perhaps the most striking development was the purchase of some 
■12 Tu-26m Backfire aircraft and AS-6 Kingfish, 300 mile range 
anti-ship missiles from the Russian Federation in late 1993.
For its armament efforts after the war with Iraq, it has 
been the Iranian claim that it was trying to reach the pre-war 
condition of combat effectiveness and strength. The Imperial 
Iranian navy was to be based on the 4 Sahan class destroyers 
and 8 missile boats of the Saam class. Before the revolution, 
Iranian navy had received respectively 2 and 5 of those ships
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from United States and United Kingdom. These units were fitted 
with average quality electronics and had been armed with the 
inferior MM38 version of the Exocet. The Imperial Iranian Navy 
also had no attached support units.^°®. During the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Iranian navy suffered a number of losses, however 
the Iranian regime ordered many new naval units to replace 
those and further strengthen its naval forces. As described 
above these include mine warfare ships, FACs, naval strike 
aircraft and submarines. Since no reliable source of 
information exist , no exact figures can be given but the 
Iranian navy is currently estimated to be comprised of 2 to 3 
destroyers with more on order from N. Korea and China, about 
12 operational missile firing frigate sized units -of United 
States, PRC and French origin, and more than two dozen smaller 
missile firing combatants. Several Boghaimer and Whaler 
class light craft armed with RPGs, recoilless guns and light 
SAMs must also be added to this sum. Iran also formed 
dedicated coastal artillery brigades, naval marine infantry 
units and a small but growing naval aviation contingent.^“ The 
Iranian navy is adequately armed to play an important role in 
the Persian Gulf. If the past performance of Iran in the Gulf 
is remembered, this increase in the Iranian naval strength is 
an indicator of regional leadership aspirations.
Iran is determined to provide its naval forces a numeric 
and qualitative advantage over other states. It is estimated 
to have paid over 2.3 billion dollars for arms during 1994. 
While most of this sum goes to air forces and army, the 
Iranian navy also gets an important share.Through the 
purchase of Kilo class submarines. Backfire naval bombers.
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heavy anti-ship missiles from Ukraine and China Iranian navy 
increased its striking strength greatly.While its navy may 
not be expected to mount long range operations, Iranian 
leadership may desire to exert more pressure over the Gulf 
States. There is actually no other force but the presence of 
the American fleet to oppose the Iranian Navy in the Gulf.
During the Gulf War, Iran has made attempts to paralyse 
the oil traffic in the region. Using its small navy of lightly 
armed vessels and inferior quality weapons, it mounted 
numerous attacks against the ships passing through the Gulf.
It is now gradually modernizing its naval capability. The 
chief mission of the Iranian navy will be denying the use of 
SLOCs in the Gulf to other states. For this type of missions, 
the Iranian navy is sufficiently armed.
The armament efforts of Iran may result in two 
developments in the region :
The reaction of the neighbouring states to oppose Iranian 
expansion and to begin forming naval forces strong enough to 
challenge the Iranian Navy. While reaction to Iranian efforts 
to exert influence in the region seems to be increasing, they 
are not organized. An effort to form a parallel naval force to 
match that of Iran's will be costly for the region's states 
that are already paying large amounts of money to arms 
purchases.
Iran may continue its efforts unopposed in the Gulf and 
might gain a superior position in the Straits of Hormuz. The 
effects of such a development can be very serious for oil 
consuming countries since Iran may cut the SLOCs passing 
through the Gulf and disrupt the flow of oil shipments.
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The Iranian navy's expansion is a clear reflection of 
that state's regional leadership aspirations. Due to the 
aggressive and radical disposition of the authoritarian 
Iranian regime, this may give way to the development of 
conflictuel situations in the future.
Regional States And Iranian Expansion
The political and the economic importance of the Persian 
Gulf due to the SLOCs passing through the region has led the 
regional countries to strengthen their naval forces.
Especially after the Iran-Iraqi war, the importance of a 
sufficiently equipped navy to protect their trade routes from 
harassment attacks became clear.
The countries in the region may oppose the efforts of 
Iran to exert its influence in the Gulf since such a 
development will negatively affect their economic and 
political links with outside the region. However, most of 
these countries are either too small like Qatar or beset by 
their own internal affairs like Yemen.
Iraq and Saudi Arabia are the two most probable countries 
in the region that will react to the Iranian expansion of 
influence in the region.
During the war with Iran, Iraq had conducted many attacks 
against the ships passing through the Gulf. However it has 
been totally destroyed by the coalition air forces in the 
first days of the air war during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.^^^ 
While the exploits of the Iraqi naval and naval air forces are
75
well-known in the Tanker war, it is clear that the Iraqi navy 
is in no position to reach the pre-Gulf War strength. Due 
United Nations sanctions the sale of military equipment to 
Iraq has been prohibited.
Iraq sent a part of its airforce to Iran in the later 
stages of the Gulf War. So far Iran has made no attempt to 
return those planes back. That is also another setback for 
Iraq since most of those planes were the ones that made up the 
modern part of its naval strike aviation.
After the Gulf War Iraq is severely hampered by United 
Nations sanctions. Under close monitoring, Iraq can not even 
try to make up its losses of the Gulf War. Therefore it is in 
no position to pose as an opponent to the Iranian expansion 
efforts in the Gulf. Besides, lack of suitable bases had 
always put Iraq at a disadvantage in naval activities. 
Therefore, even if an Iraqi military expansion comes into 
effect, Iraqi efforts - as was in the war with Iran, will 
mainly rely on naval-aviation and coastal missile artillery 
where it has a better chance of disrupting the Gulf maritime 
traffic as well as attacking Iranian shipping. That will also 
nullify the power of the Iranian navy. However, as long as the 
United Nations sanctions prevail, this looks quite out of 
probability. In the present situation Iraq is quite out of the 
picture with its military capability severely depleted after 
two wars and in no position to be used since such a breach of 
United Nations sanctions is sure to bring down immediate 
retaliation.
The other contender, Saudi Arabia has vast economic 
resources. Besides it is the most populated country in the
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Southern Gulf and deploys the biggest military force. It is in 
a good position to exert its influence in the region and 
become the leader of the Southern Gulf countries. The Saudi 
Navy is the second largest navy in the Gulf after Iran.^ ®^ It 
has capable ships with Western technology. The Saudi navy is 
growing in size and capability. This is chiefly due to the 
Western supplied equipment that began to flow into Saudi 
Arabia steadily after 1987.^’·®
Saudi naval assets include well equipped bases in the A1 
Qatif and Jubayl. These are the most extensive naval bases in 
the region and may serve the logistics of the Saudi navy 
successfully. Naval aviation is based in those installations 
that amount to more than 20 ASW aircraft and at least 4 AEW&C 
planes.
On the other hand the effectiveness of the navy is beset 
by some important factors. The level of readiness has not 
risen very much in parallel to the expansion of military 
capability. While adequately armed to meet a naval threat, the 
personnel needs training on the use of these newly acquired 
weapons. Apart from the low level of training, the Saudi 
navy is also undermanned badly and needs another decade of 
manpower expansion to fully man its naval assets. Another 
point is that due to the origin of the equipment used, Saudis 
are tied to the Western maintenance and logistic support to a 
great extent. Therefore it can not be expected to endure 
lengthy operations at sea without the Western support.
The Saudi navy has grown significantly in the last 
decade, and it is the most capable naval force in the Persian 
Gulf after the Iranian navy. It may be used as an instrument
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of Saudi Arabia to oppose the Iranian expansion of influence 
in the area and also to support a similar motive of the Saudi 
leadership. But it is still far from mounting extensive naval 
operations due to the operational constraints imposed on her 
naval force described above.
The naval expansion of the Iranian navy in the Gulf is a 
serious concern for the regional states that have witnessed 
its actions during the Iran-Iraq war. However, the probability 
of formation of an effective naval force to counter it in the 
region is low for the time being. The situation may change in 
the future when Saudi Arabia completes its naval expansion and 
raises a fully self-contained naval force with ships and 
personnel. Also Iraq is sure to step up to such efforts if the 
United Nations sanctions that bar its re-armament efforts are 
lifted. If these developments happen, such efforts are sure to 
clash with the Iranian naval expansion in the region.
Middle East: Potential For Conflict
With the rise of radical elements in the Middle East, the 
SLOCs in the region will come under pressure from the possible 
hostile reactions of such regimes. As stated above these are 
very important transportation routes, vital to the stability 
of the world.
Deployment of the fast and heavily armed and hard to 
detect small missile boats, silent diesel-electric submarines 
and high performance attack aircraft in the inventories of the 
navies of such countries^^^ may also seriously disrupt
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operations in the Middle East region.The threat is 
multiplied by the extensive arming efforts of states in the 
region and the increasing availability of high capability 
weapon systems. These additions to armouries of states in the 
region which have regional leadership aspirations and little 
respect for the territorial rights of their neighbours may 
further decrease their hesitations to interdict the SLOCs 
passing in the region. During a conflict, such an option may 
be chosen by these countries as an instrument of policy 
against the West which depends on these lines to a great 
extent. Another potential source of conflict may be the 
disputes over the sharing of marine natural resources which is 
an essentially littoral problem.
4.6 The Growth Of The Regional Navies
The growth of regional navies as described above signals 
the transition of the sea control from blue water to the 
littorals. A-uthors that write about the emergence of regional 
navies often point out the increase in the striking capability 
of these small navies.Coastal and regional navies are 
developing into small but capable navies armed with surface, 
air and submarine forces.
The naval security environment increasingly resembles the 
pre-World War II one with the growth of regional naval 
capabilities. In contrast to,the cold war era where security 
interests were ranked most important, economic interests will 
have a higher priority in future. Former allies of the cold
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war, are becoming economic adversaries. Troubled trade 
relations between some' countries may get worse if one of the 
sides, enjoying a certain advantage because of its navy, 
chooses to rely on naval power to ensure economic interests.
While these developments may not result in all-out wars, 
they may lead to clashes involving small numbers of combatants 
indulging in disruptive raids. It is questionable that the 
world will see the return of privateering, however there may 
indeed be a temptation on the side of the powers with capable 
regional navies to use them in the solutions of problems.
Being a flexible diplomatic tool, naval forces are likely be 
utilized by decision makers frequently.
Preservation of the integrity of the world economy will 
be a primary security goal in the new post-cold war period. 
This will depend on the elimination of the possible sources of 
threat. This task can be challenged by the current 
developments as described in this chapter. The complexity of 
the task is also multiplied by the fact that, potential 
sources of threats must be analysed and recognized in advance.
Certainly, it would be quite erroneous to see the states 
with strong regional navies as potential aggressors to world 
peace and stability. But some of these states may have 
aspirations for greater regional roles. Therefore, it would 
not be an exaggeration to view the development of regional 
powers, especially those that have displayed a radical, and 
aggressive nature with extreme caution.
It is clear that the focus on the control and command of 
the sea is shifting from the open sea to the littorals. As a 
concept that contains a defensive side, the use of the sea
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presently will certainly be affected from the increased 
deployment of the naval weapon systems in all navies and more 
importantly; from an increase in the number and strength of 
regional navies. If it is also considered that some of those 
navies belong to states with strong regional aspirations, 
development of conflictual situations can be expected in the 
future.
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V REDEFINITION OF NAVAL MISSIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR 
ENVIRONMENT
Based on the framework outlined in the second chapter of 
the study, the following two chapters have examined the 
changes brought by the developments in the political and 
technological dimensions of the naval strategic environment. 
The analysis of the former parts of the study is presented in 
the first part of this chapter. The tasks carried out by the 
naval forces in the post-cold war period will be shaped 
according to these developments. This chapter attempts to 
explain which missions of the naval forces will be stressed in 
operations in this new context.
5.1 Prospects For The Naval Strategic Environment
The general consensus regarding possible crises in the 
post-cold war era is that they will not be high level 
conflicts. In the past there was great concern that a cold war 
crisis could easily turn into a nuclear catastrophe. The 
revolutions of the early 1990s in Eastern Europe, successful 
arms control treaties and the subsequent disintegration of the 
Soviet Union with its successors deeply involved in their own 
domestic problems have all signalled the exit of the concept 
of nuclear escalation from the terminology of military 
thinkers.
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The elimination of the superpower rivalry on a global 
basis will certainly reduce the possibility of high intensity 
crisis. On the other hand, as one writer had predicted, while 
the Gulf War of 1991 was a notice to those Third World states 
that may entertain a similar motive over the sovereignty of a 
state or disruption of international stability, it could have 
been missed.Most authors agree that the decrease in the 
probability of a high intensity conflict is matched by an 
increase in the probability of emergence of low intensity, 
small scale skirmishes around the globe.
The rise of a crisis in the naval environment also 
follows the same pattern. The exit of the Soviet navy left a 
power vacuum in the naval environment. The rise of a conflict 
may be also due to other reasons. When the Argentinean Navy 
decided to occupy the Falklands, the military leaders of 
Argentina thought that Britain would not react swiftly and 
decisively to save the islands. It seems that such crises are 
highly dependent on the decision makers' perception of the 
situation; conflicts usually appear when one side fails to 
assess the importance of the case to the other side. This may 
well be the case in the future.
As examined by the study, territorial disputes will 
actually be the most common element in the list of possible 
naval conflict in the post-cold war period. Even in the cold 
war various problems existed as potential reasons of 
territorial dispute, which were kept under control because of 
the constraints of the bi-polar cold war environment.
Potential reasons concerning the distribution of oil or an 
equally precious element vital to the economies of the states
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are more probable. Similarly the rights of passage through a 
disputed area may lead to conflicts between neighbours.
The sensitivity of extra-regional countries to such naval 
conflicts may be on the rise. The increasing importance of 
marine activities to the economy of the states make them more 
sensitive to such issues. This was vividly demonstrated by the 
Tanker War in the Gulf. The emergence of a situation in a 
distant region that indirectly affects the economic stability 
of the world economy will prompt even the extra-regional 
states to react against the cause of the problem.
It must be noted that most of the territorial problems 
that involve some of the most hostile political regimes among 
the oil producing states have not been solved. The Gulf wars 
of the last decade; the one between Iran and Iraq and the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and its subsequent defeat in the 
hands of the allied coalition must always be a reminder that 
these conflicts may easily escalate into a full sized regional 
war. Today almost all Gulf countries still have claims over 
each other's land and sea areas. They are closely followed by 
the South East Asian states that have fought some 'quiet' 
naval wars over disputed areas in the last two decades.
There may be additional states in the other regions of 
the world that may also be entertaining similar intentions 
over disputed maritime areas. After the end of the cold war 
some countries began to enjoy regional leadership aspirations 
as described earlier in the study. These are potential threats 
to the security in the naval environment of the future.
In the problems that have escalated from such claims, 
intervention of the outside powers for the solution of crisis
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to the case must be expected. In such cases the use of the 
SLOCs will remain the most optimum solution to transport the 
bulk of the heavy material.Coalition forces have used the 
sea to send in their forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990. In a 
future intervention the use of the sea will still be the only 
cost-effective option for the outside powers to transport 
their heavy forces and equipment to the area.
The number of sovereign states has increased with the 
break up of some of the former eastern bloc states. With the 
absence of a strong international authority to regulate the 
relations between them, there is potential for the emergence 
of crises in such a chaotic environment.
Taking the new factors of the post-cold war era into 
consideration such as the rise of militancy, proliferation of 
military high technology and continuing high tension in 
various parts of the world, it becomes clear that conflicts 
will stay with us in the post-cold war era. Cohen's following 
observation points to the sources of conflict;
"War, and potential war, will remain a feature of 
international politics. Its sources will be many and 
changing, from ethnic animosity to irredentism, from 
competition for power to religious fanaticism. Its 
stakes will include territory (including valuable 
offshore properties ), water rights, and control of 
populations.
In this anarchic environment where the potential threat 
of escalation into wars exist, the need for an effective 
instrument of policy is evident. In this respect the naval 
forces may be quite useful. They can operate in proximity of 
each other. Therefore navies have more chance to become 
involved in an international intercourse than the other
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branches of military forces. They can communicate political 
messages in support of national policy. Their role as 
described earlier extents to supporting stability and building 
confidence. They may also act as a threat by their mere 
presence and potential military strength.
5.2 Redefinition Of The Tasks: Missions For The Naval 
Power In The Nevr Era.
The use of each type of naval missions has been favoured 
in a certain period of history. The early 1900s was dominated 
by the extensive naval diplomacy performances of the 
industrialized nations, World War II saw the navies, backed by 
technological advances and governed by political as well as 
military conditions, fighting over large distances and 
projecting their power over land for the first time. In the 
cold war period the naval powers of NATO and USSR were given 
the task of providing a second strike capability and form a 
leg of the nuclear deterrence. At the same time concepts like 
forward presence and showing the flag appeared as the most 
frequently exercised missions of all the navies.
Navies are instruments of states in pursuing their aims 
at the international platform. The objectives of the states 
are shaped by the developments that take place in the 
international dimension. The ruling military and political 
conditions of the period also affect states in their pursuit 
of national objectives. Therefore a strong link exists between
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the conditions of the period and the type of naval operations 
undertaken by the states.
In the post-cold war period, some types of naval 
operation are emerging as more probable than others. They are 
more adaptable to the conditions of the new naval strategic 
environment. The following part of the study will discuss 
those missions that will be more frequently exercised by the 
navies and also those which will decline in importance.
5.3 Diplomatic Roles For Navies In The New Period
Gunboat Diplomacy
During the last decade the gunboat diplomacy has been 
exercised by a number of states in the course of their 
political ventures. The East-West balance of terror in the 
world was the basis of stability in the cold war and prevented 
resort to force. Therefore the exercise of the gunboat 
diplomacy has largely been restricted to expressive actions 
to show attitudes to the other side by the superpowers and 
their client states.
The face of the gunboat diplomacy in the post-cold war 
environment will be different from the cold war period. The 
growing littoral aspect of the naval problems will be an 
important factor. It may tempt 'some states to deploy their 
naval forces to make demonstrative actions to signal their 
policy objectives. As shown earlier in the study, there are
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indications that some states such as China and India may be 
including such possible uses of their naval forces in their 
plans already.
States that have radical or totalitarian leaderships may 
decide to perform even more aggressive acts. By tradition, 
such leaderships have often shown great inclination for using 
force wherever possible in their diplomatic relations. Those 
states may decide to use their naval forces - now growing in 
capability with the purchase of advanced weaponry in such acts 
against western states if they find themselves in a position 
to do so.
The resolve to protect freedom of navigation by means of 
ship and aircraft operations on and over the oceans of the 
world may also necessitate the use of gunboat diplomacy. 
Already several peacetime "freedom of navigation" programs 
have been designed to help ensure adherence to the provisions 
of the UNCLOS. In support of these programs, Western naval 
policies, led by the United States as the only global naval 
power, will be designed to suppress maritime claim.s 
inconsistent with international law. It can be expected that 
the United States navy will probably take active part in this
. 130issue.
Therefore, the nature of gunboat diplomacy must be 
expected to change in the coming years. The low level of the 
force used in the previous period will give way to missions of 
gunboat diplomacy in which higher levels of force will be 
employed to create fait accomplis. The use of gunboat 
diplomacy will probably be the mission of choice for the 
navies which aim to support the political objectives of their
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states. With the growing possibilities for a conflictual 
situation in the naval environment, it may be exercised 
frequently.
5.4 Constabulary Roles For Navies
Naval Forces And Crisis Control
After the end of the cold war, diminishing of Soviet 
influence will tend to reduce the possibility of a high level 
conflict. However this relaxation in the constraints of the 
cold war period may allow states to act more vigorously in 
search of what they perceive to be their sovereignty and their 
sovereign rights in maritime zones. Therefore the maritime 
environment contains the seeds for crises in the future. Some 
conflicts that were present in the cold war were kept in check 
and began to emerge when the constraining factors of the cold 
war began to fade away from the international environment.
These seeds of political crisis will definitely bring 
forward the possibility of the naval crisis management; these 
can be described as follows:
a) Despite being still unratified by all the members, some 
UNCLOS principles are exercised by a number of countries 
in a way that is advantageous to them. How sovereignty is 
to be exercised in both demarcated and undemarcated 
maritime zones is a most typical example of this type of 
problem. As a further extension of the problem.
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continuing problems between states over the even 
distribution and exploitation of the marine resources 
also pose a threat. The strong, continuing difference of 
opinion between the United States and the other nations 
on UNCLOS issues may take years to resolve. The 
supporters of the UNCLOS are, with only a few exceptions. 
Third World countries that are not major naval powers.
b) The ongoing presence of smuggling, piracy, terrorism, 
hijacking, illegal fishing, and similar unlawful 
activities -sometimes backed up by a regional power, are 
also possible reasons.
c) Perhaps the most probable reason for a political crisis 
may be a state's actions in those areas over which it 
claims the exercise of sovereignty.
There does not seem to be an accepted status quo in the 
maritime areas of the world today. This lack of a balance in 
the environment indicates the existence of an unstable 
situation that may present a number of crises which may emerge 
in the future. The seeds for a potential conflict of a naval 
dimension are plenty. Eventually, one or more of these 
problems will surface in the international arena. When that 
time comes, the navies will be in the most favourable position 
to affect the relatively peaceful containment of the 
situation. The crises management in the naval dimension will 
therefore be an important role of the navies.
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Coastal states are gradually increasing their extent of 
jurisdiction over wider areas of sea. With this development, 
the need for enforcing regulatory processes will be required. 
The safeguarding of the maritime resources by the navies will 
be a step before the problem appears. In that respect the 
future of the jurisdictional missions will become something of 
a preventive measure. If necessary regulations are imposed on 
the maritime resources in the sea backed by the 
effectively-led naval forces, the need for crisis management 
will become redundant.
As noted by some writers, it has been a concern that the 
tendency of the states to enlarge the sea areas under their 
national jurisdiction may increase in the absence of an 
enforced international lav/.^ "^ This whittling away of the 
world's high seas into national maritime areas must be 
regulated with an effective estate management regime. 
Especially in the face of heavily armed, small or medium sized 
navies, such politico-legal missions, designed in a way to 
pre-empt possible conflicts will be important tasks for the 
navies.
There are also other reasons for such missions,· the 
recent example of Amoco Cadiz accident where the oil leakage 
from that tanker destroyed large areas of sea life^ ^^  
illustrates how lethal can be the sea accidents. They have 
caused a significant amount of pollution. The number of such 
accidents can increase since ship owners pressured by the
Jurisdictional Tasks; Protecting Maritime Resources
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financial difficulties indulge in practices as racing rides, 
cutting corners, and shelving maintenance schedules. The 
increase in the sheer volume of sea transport is also another 
factor. It has been stated that the size of the world's 
maritime fleet has gone up over four times in the last 35 
y e a r s . I t  is clear that the shipping routes must be 
regulated just like the air routes.
The mission of safeguarding and controlling the maritime 
zones of importance will be most important in the focal 
points, like the English Channel, Suez and Panama channels.
The local states are most likely to be increasingly involved 
in shipping surveillance, traffic separation schemes, the 
identification, interception and arrest of offenders, in 
salvage and wreck clearance in the course of such missions.
It now remains to suggest the ways in which the growth of 
these activities will affect the world's navies and, 
indirectly perhaps, the maritime strategy of present and 
future. In the first place, the establishment of a global 
regime for the offshore estate is as yet nowhere near 
accomplishment. For the time being, disputes over lines of 
jurisdiction would seem a likely feature of the international 
diplomatic scene.
Finally it must be stated that with the increasing value 
of the natural resources, states will increasingly use their 
navies for the safeguarding of such resources against all 
kinds of threats ranging from hostile ones to unintended sea 
accidents. Therefore, the estate management at sea will be an 
important task for the navies.
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Although the use of naval forces to assist international 
peacekeeping and making operations is not new, this kind of 
operations were not practised frequently in the past. During 
the Spanish Civil war,the British Navy had blockaded the 
Spanish territorial waters against possible foreign assistance 
by Germany and Italy. The Royal Navy also helped the 
evacuation of Spanish refugees. In the early 1970s, United 
Nations naval forces undertook mine clearance operations in 
the Suez and Bangladeshi ports. The Gulf War of 1990 saw the 
greatest concentration of warships for the implementation of a 
United Nations resolution.Finally under. United Nations 
flag, a flotilla of frigates now patrol the Adriatic, 
intercepting ships that may be carrying an arms cargo to the 
former Yugoslavia while an aircraft carrier group operates its 
aircraft to carry on air raids under the direction of the 
Security Council resolutions.^^“
Especially in this case where conditions necessitate the 
presence of an international force, such types of operations 
will be very important. Peacekeeping may not be the most 
commonly practiced method of naval activities, but the new 
period will see an increase in its practice due to the 
following reasons :
1) The increase in the strength of the regional navies 
and the risk ,of opposed maritime jurisdiction.
2) The low intensity threats to the maritime lines such 
as terrorism and piracy.
Naval Peacekeeping And Peacemaking
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3) The commitment for maintaining freedom of navigation.
4) Giving tactical and strategic logistic support to the 
United Nations forces on the land.
The increase in the strength of regional navies has been 
discussed before. This fact coupled with a tendency by some 
countries to increase maritime economic zones under the yet 
unratified UNCLOS may lead to serious disputes. Several zones 
where conflicts may spark exist such as the recent Turco-Greek 
dispute over the 12 mile national boundary limits in the 
Aegean Sea.
The opposed delimitation of access to these zones by some 
states may result in a call upon United Nations authorized 
forces to take part in the solution of the dispute or in the 
preservation of a status quo.
In such situations the obvious choice of military forces 
will be the naval units which can be placed under a 
centralized United Nations command to seek solution of the 
problem. Timely deployment of the warships in an area of 
possible conflict can greatly decrease the time of reaction in 
a probable crisis situation. The possibility of prompt 
handling of those crises and a swift response by United 
Nations warships may also deter possible violators.
Another area that can be the target of United Nations 
naval operations may be the prevention of piracy and terrorism 
in international waters. Especially the piracy in the 
Southeast Pacific, Indian Ocean and South Atlantic have always 
been a severe threat against the SLOCs passing near these 
potential areas of trouble.“’ The reason for this is chiefly 
due to the following reasons :
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1) Pirates often take refuge in the territorial waters of 
a neighbouring state when pursued by a naval police force.
2) More often than not, pirates have far more fire power 
than the individual naval police ships that are employed by 
these states for patrolling purposes. Small Iranian motor 
launches demonstrated how effective the small arms fire could 
be against ships during the Gulf War. The wide availability of 
small weapons like RPG-7, LAW and even hand held antiaircraft 
missiles like SA-7 in the world black market compound the 
lethality of these pirate attacks, both against the merchant 
ships and also the police forces.
3) The small size of the pirate and terrorist ships and 
the vast areas that have to be covered by the patrols multiply
13 9the scale of problem.
As can be concluded from the above discussion the 
presence of a unified control is important. All the problems 
stated above also dictate the mandatory presence of 
international patrolling forces in these areas. Such a force 
composed of modern and powerful light surface ships of the big 
naval powers and backed by United Nations support will be most 
suitable to handle the problem. The creation of such a force 
under a United Nations flag will also prevent the legal and 
political problems that may arise, from any unilateral action 
by any national naval force.
The policing duty of the navies is beginning to be 
exercised by more and more states. The deployment of the 
United States warships in the Colombian territorial waters for 
anti-drugtrafficking operations was an important step taken in 
this direction.
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The above points illustrate the potential for naval 
contribution to United Nations efforts. The major navies of 
the cold war, that are now under constant threat from cost 
cutting and downsizing schemes may look warmly to such ideas 
for their eventual salvation.
Navies, after the end of the cold war, are in a position 
to give utmost support to the United Nations efforts. Their 
help, direct or indirect to the problems of the world ranging 
from the humanitarian aid operations to peacekeeping will be 
an important addition to the United Nations efforts. Also in 
the cases of acts of aggression against the shipping routes in 
international waters, we may expect to see the formation of 
multi-national naval task forces as the one in the Iran-Irag 
war to escort the merchant shipping and if necessary to 
eliminate the sources of instability.
We can expect to see an increase in the number of such 
naval operations in support of United Nations efforts. The 
end of the cold war constraints gave the navies a free hand to 
follow such types of naval tasks more easily. Another point is 
that, the presence of such a task may actually save most 
navies from the cost-cutting schemes by giving them a new 
viable objective.
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5.5 Military Roles Of The Navies
The Future Of The Command And Control Of The Sea
The naval superiority enjoyed by the West for the control 
of the sea gave it the ability to reach any part of the world 
using the sea lines of communications. Therefore, control of 
the seas came to be taken for granted by the West for a very 
long time that used the sea for their commerce. The support of 
this security and economic system is very important for the 
future of world peace
The future of the West's ability to retain control of the 
sea is not without problems. After the end of the cold war and 
the disintegration of the USSR, there is no longer a need for 
NATO to win sea control in the important areas that cover the 
SLOG'S. However, the ability for an ensured continued access to 
the seas is still required for the free world. Despite the 
development of air and extensive land transportation routes, 
the use of SLOCs remain the cheapest means of transporting 
goods in bulk. This will continue in the present period in an 
increasing scale. Currently the seaborne trade that crosses 
borders accounts for more than 80% of the world trade by 
v o l u m e . I f  the amount carried by weight is taken the figure 
rises to a dominating 95% including the inland borders.^“' With 
the seaborne trade rising again, it is clear that the West 
will pay greater attention to SLOCs and will try to keep them 
under control. Indeed access to the SLOCs is important
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especially for the West in the present security environment. 
This is because since continued stability of the global 
economy depends more than ever on seaborne commerce. The 
control of the sea areas that cover these lines is therefore 
vital.
The control and command of the sea areas will be even 
more important to international security because of another 
very important aspect of the SLOCs. The real importance of the 
free access to the world SLOCs comes from the fact that these 
lines carry some of the most critical elements to the 
industries of the West such as crude oil and petroleum 
products. Over 949 million tonnes of the former and 310 
million tonnes of the latter are carried by ships.
The concept of control will also be important in 
preventing the territorial problems that may emerge as the 
result of the regional ambitions of the states. The experience 
of the Gulf Tanker War makes this clear, the diplomatic 
initiatives of the western governments failed to deter Iran 
and Iraq from engaging the unarmed merchantmen and tankers. 
Iran even went so far as to attack Kuwaiti ports with the 
Silkworm missiles it had purchased from the PRC.^ '^* Only when 
the Western naval deployment into the region began to arrive, 
did the Iranian navy's attacks began to decline in effect.
This was due to the defences provided by those forces. It also 
tried to exert pressure on these sources to force them to 
withdraw from the Gulf. However when the United States naval 
forces began to counter the Iranian navy's small boat and air 
attacks against the Gulf transit routes and inflict losses on 
them, Iran withdrew from such operations. Even then, Iranian
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navy tried to show further acts of aggression aimed at 
disrupting the shipping whenever it found an opportunity.
This example shows clearly the link between the control 
of the sea and the right of free passage for traditional 
causes. This right can only be taken for granted if the sea 
area under question is effectively controlled by the forces 
friendly to the idea of free passage. On the other hand, it's 
impractical to wait, even from the only global naval power - 
the US to have the command and control over all of the sea 
areas under dispute.
However, in the light of the increases in the naval 
military holdings of some nations that border the 
concentration areas of maritime shipping and their radical 
attitudes in the recent times, the right of free passage in 
those areas has become highly questionable.
The naval power of the West, especially that of United 
States has been successful in deterring probable hostile 
intentions to interfere v/ith free access to the sea. However 
in the new era, the control of the sea is a source of anxiety 
for the West. It was during the Gulf War that most of the 
allied naval officers had serious concerns over the 
vulnerability of sea lines of the coalition in proximity to 
Libya and Yemen. While none of these countries had more than 
small coastal navies,-it wouldn't be too difficult for them to 
exert pressure on the SLOCs using even the few resources they 
had.
The difficulty of keeping the control of the sea is 
multiplied by the fact that threats do not have to be posed by 
naval combatants. A variety of m.eans have been tested
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operationally and used in wars after 1945. Among them, mining 
the probable routes of passage along SLOCs are open to almost 
any navy who possesses more than a tug-boat fleet. Mining can 
be very effective, a fact demonstrated during the 1984-1987 
Tanker War and the 1984 mining of the Red Sea.
In fact it is relatively easy even for a small navy to 
harass the SLOCs using a number of indirect and passive means 
as illustrated by the experiences of the Iran-Irag war. 
Currently about 71 nations possess anti-ship missiles, and a 
further 46 have naval mine capabilities. Besides any 
littoral nation with land-based military aircraft can pose a 
threat to SLOCs since the non-availability of a sea-borne 
AEW&C will increase their chances of penetration into the area 
and inflict damage.
The command and the control of the sea areas covering the 
commerce SLOCs will be one of the most important tasks of the 
navies in the post-cold war period. Under the light of this 
fact we can expect to see that special attention will be paid 
to freedom of navigation in the open seas.
Naval Power Projection: The Ability To Influence
As the changing in naval security environment continues 
to evolve the former naval missions, one of such will be naval 
power projection. In the cold war, naval power was the primary 
means by which superpov/ers tried to exert influence over 
international developments of the world relations.
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The post-Cold war conditions will affect the naval power 
projection mission. However the probable changes in the 
applicability of naval power projection must be examined in 
two levels of operational coverage: global and regional.
During the cold war complete global power projection was 
available only to the United States navy.^ '*^  Despite having a 
large and capable navy, the USSR never had the capability to 
deploy necessary sea control, sea lift and power projection 
assets for totally dominating the naval environment. Its naval 
forces provided only a very limited global power protection 
capability that did not extend much longer than the local 
naval environment of the USSR and its allies. The American 
Navy, built on this idea, was the most capable naval force in 
such missions. Power projection at the global level still 
remains within the capability of the United States navy. It is 
also seen as an available American policy option in the 
post-cold war period as in the words of a writer :
"For the United States isolationist naval power 
projection will be the means by which conflicts are 
resolved on someone else's soil. For the 
internationalist, it will be a United States 
instrument necessary for world leadership.
However the forward presence of the United States navy is 
slowly passing away from the cold war footing to a post-cold 
war environment. When it was first envisaged by the naval 
authorities in the 1970s, the global power projection was 
meant to take on the Soviet naval bases in the northern flank 
of the NATO. Therefore, the United States navy had grown to a 
size that could fight and win against the whole might of the
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Soviet Fleet and supporting air assets of the Soviet naval 
aviation.
It is clear that there's no need for the United States 
navy to pay for naval assets that it no longer needs. The last 
changes in the naval deployment plans are expected to include 
cuts in the number of surface warships deployed in the carrier 
battle groups. It is clear that with the passage of cold war 
rivalry from the international arena, the United States 
leadership will find little reason to deploy the same number 
of naval assets.
It may be expected that the global power projection will 
remain as an option only to the United States navy in the 
future, however even the United States navy is showing 
reluctance to keep the number of ships that was needed for the 
cold war.^ °^ With the rising costs of maintenance and the 
effects of her stalled economy, the US will show a tendency to 
cut down or at least 'mothball' some of this excess capacity. 
With the passing of its most successful and only user, power 
projection v;ill not be a mission that will be frequented by 
the navies in the global level.
On the other hand the major navies of the West as well as 
some of the emerging naval powers have the capability to mount 
similar operations, albeit at a regional level. The major 
navies such as that of Britain and of France retain a regional 
power projection capability. The Royal Navy extended her 
presence over the South Atlantic and after a costly but 
successful clash with the Argentinean air and naval forces^ 
will repeat the feat once more if the need comes to it.
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Russia, remaining as the chief benefactor of the ex-USSR 
retains a fleet that can easily undertake power projection 
missions on the regional level. In addition, the fact that new 
Russia will be committed to the naval operation to preserve 
the Russian interests has been voiced by the Russian naval 
authorities.
It has been previously stated that the growth of the 
regional navies had been based on the ambitions of the 
regional powers to exert more political influence in their 
respective regions. Therefore it must be expected that these 
navies will look warmly to the regional power projection. 
Indeed as examined earlier they are already trying to improve 
their capabilities to undertake power projection missions. The 
emerging navies in the East that signal growing capabilities 
for projecting power in their regions are good examples. China 
is trying to improve its forces capability to land forces on 
beaches by airborne delivery from naval units. Iran and India 
also show the same line of trend by deploying a number of 
amphibious vessels and increasing the quantity and the quality 
of their naval air arms.
As a result of recent technological developments, naval 
forces may be in a better position to make contributions to 
land operations by air strikes, traditional shore bombardment, 
and amphibious landings. There is also the cruise missile 
which represents a new family of weapons. It can be used in 
land attacks at far greater ranges which had been previously 
covered by the nuclear weapons. The effectiveness and 
potential of cruise missile technology suggest that it could 
eventually become the primary v/eapon of navies. While the
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cruise missiles are also slowly becoming available to the 
medium size navies, most of the current designs of anti-ship 
missiles can be easily turned into crude but nonetheless 
useful cruise missiles to be used against land targets. 
Especially as the targeting techniques and missile 
capabilities of these nations improve, a larger number of 
users will emerge.
Naval power projection is far more than the total sum of 
the destructive power of ordnance carried by missiles and 
aircraft. It includes an amphibious capability which can 
intervene in a crisis or provide humanitarian assistance.
Force operating in the international water of a region 
affected by a crisis can be projected ashore by degrees. It 
must be stated that the threat of naval power projection also 
has an impact as vividly seen in the World War II. Naval power 
projection in all of its forms will remain in the agendas of 
the naval decision makers. However this operation type of the 
navies will reflect the changes in the decreasing conflict 
levels. Therefore, the lesser scale missions (performed by the 
regional and coastal navies in support of their objectives ) 
will be exercised more often than the grand scale version of 
the power projection.
Nuclear Deterrence And Defence: The Fading Role
The mission of 'nuclear deterrence was developed to meet 
the conditions of the cold war. Today, Russian leadership has 
made it clear that the new Russian Federation poses no nuclear
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threat to the United States. It is clear that deterrence 
will undergo a transformation in its concept.
Global Nuclear Deterrence
This transformation will vary according to the different 
levels of the nuclear deterrence. At the global level, which 
was its most widely theorized form, there is no visible future 
for this type of mission since there is now no Soviet Union to 
deter. The future also shows no contenders for this position. 
The extinction of a global scale nuclear attack threat on the 
remaining superpower and the West may be said to have left the 
nuclear forces of the West somehow disoriented.
During the cold war. United States deterrence was based 
on a predictable, "rational" Soviet leadership. Both sides 
were familiar with each others' nuclear doctrine, posture and 
alert signals. However, the same is not true for today; a 
former American official has observed that offensive United 
States forces may not be able to deter an accidental or 
miscalculated launch of a CIS nuclear weapon. The exit of 
the 'rational' actors in Moscow also left gaps in the 
formulations of new templates for the naval nuclear 
deterrence.
It is clear that the naval nuclear deterrence is now an 
"out of the area" problem for the navies. The global nuclear 
deterrence which was so dependent on the naval forces has now 
lost much of its raison d'être. A clear indication of this may 
be decisions taken by the United States and Russia to 
discontinue their SSBN programs. Therefore global nuclear
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deterrence will not be a highly likely mission for future 
naval forces.
On the other hand another dimension of deterrence is 
raised by the nuclear proliferation into the Third World 
countries. It is a frequently asked question how to deter 
emerging nuclear powers. Nuclear deterrence will, as 
previously, depend upon an opponent receiving, and 
understanding intended signals as credible.
The active use of nuclear weapons by those states is also 
a grave possibility. While the deployment of naval nuclear 
weapons in the navies of these countries may seem to be of 
little probability, the land based nuclear weapons in the 
arsenals of these countries also affect the nuclear forces of 
the major navies at sea. During the tanker war, Iran had made 
repeated attacks on the US surface warships using whatever 
means available to it. At one time it was even reported that 
it went to such extremes such as forming a suicide-attack air 
squadron to attack the American carrier assets in the 
r e g i on.As various sources indicate, Iran may have probably 
gained access to a number of nuclear gravity bombs and 
warheads and significantly improved its nuclear capability. It 
would be terrifying to think that these can be used against a 
naval concentration.^^“ The probability of their usage against 
neighbouring countries is equally terrifying.
Nuclear deterrence can be of use in such cases. The 
targeting of the land based ICBMs may not be possible against 
these targets in those regions of the globe that fall outside 
the maximum range of these missiles in their current 
deployment sites. The most obvious option will be then the
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use of naval assets or neighbouring air bases. However there 
may be occasions when the use of nearby bases can not be 
possible. This can be due to the reluctance of the 
neighbouring countries to allow their bases to be used for a 
nuclear bombing attack, or there may not be such a base after 
all. Therefore, nuclear deterrence against the Third World 
state, if it becomes necessary, will be undertaken by the 
naval forces.
In such situations the first obvious option is the use of 
the naval air delivered gravity bombs. However the increasing 
effectiveness of the air defense systems of the Third World 
countries may jeopardize the delivery of the payload as well 
as its accuracy. In such cases cruise missiles may be employed 
to minimize the casualties. As witnessed in the Gulf conflict 
the sea launched cruise missiles have gained an excellent 
degree of accuracy. They can be launched from a number of 
platforms including submarines, carrier aircraft such as F18 
Hornet: and A6 Intruder, submarines, surface ships including 
even small sized destroyers. In addition to these, are the 
usual SSBN platforms which using their ICBMs can provide a 
heavy punch if needed.
The use of the navies in the deterrence missions can be 
in a highly different manner. The surface ships of the major 
navies bristle with long range, anti-SSM surface-to-air 
Missiles. These can be employed as part of an interim theatre 
missile defence system against the growing threat ballistic 
missile proliferation.^” Their mobility allows them to operate 
in troubled parts of the world. The availability of such 
mobile ATBM defences in hot spots may deter use and deployment
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of ballistic missiles by regional states, discouraging its 
use.
Nuclear deterrence will remain as a mission that is 
exercised only by major powers since only they will have the 
necessary hardware to mount nuclear weapons at sea. On the 
other hand one side of the equation in the deterrence function 
is likely to be changed. The target may be Third World 
countries armed with nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence at 
the global level will be a less pronounced naval mission. The 
deterrence against smaller powers however remain on the agenda 
of the naval powers since on such occasions, they will be out 
of the reach of most land based nuclear weapons and only the 
naval nuclear weapons will be in a situation to be used 
against them. There is also the possibility of the deployment 
of naval units as ATBM launch stations that will enhance the 
deterrence capability. Therefore it can be stated that the 
deterrence missions will be of lesser scales than the cold war 
era in the new period.
5.6 Conclusion
The naval roles in the new strategic environment will be 
shaped according to the conditions of the post-cold war era.
In this new environment which has been examined in the course 
of the study, some roles of the navies will decline in 
importance, while some will appear as more dominant in scope 
and importance.
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In dealing with the highly fluctuating political problems 
of the world, there's need for a flexibility both in the 
policy and instruments. It was because of similar realities 
that the West has adopted navies to act as instruments to deal 
with instabilities in the world and also with the crises to 
which those instabilities might lead. In this respect, 
possible other uses for the naval power can be deterring 
aggression or for guaranteeing the security of all.
In the highly unpredictable environment of international 
politics, it will not be too erroneous to predict new and 
unexpected developments directly affecting stability and 
peace. This highlights the importance of a flexible response 
to prevent crises getting out of hand. Naval forces are 
particularly useful in such cases since they can keep the 
adversary guessing, act in a gradual way, and if things go 
wrong, can be withdrawn.
In the constabulary role, the jurisdictional tasks such 
as controlling and safeguarding the vital maritime zones will 
be the first line of preventive tool for the elimination of 
possibilities of conflicts. Navies have a unique capability of 
demonstrating non-threatening interest in sea and coastal 
areas of concern. Besides they have the capability to patrol 
and monitor the developments and act immediately, making them 
quite useful for constabulary missions.
The freedom of navigation must continue, the economic and 
political stability of the world rests on it. It is easy to 
predict that attempts to block the passage of shipping may 
lead to dramatically acute shortages of energy , resources and 
cause unhealthy fluctuations in the world trade balance. The
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lack of decisive standing may give way to repeated offences so 
if one must rely on international regulatory systems, they 
must be reinforced by show of resolve. The possibility of 
conflict as a result of such operations will remain high. 
Therefore it must be expected that navies will be increasingly 
used in constabulary roles such as crisis management, 
off-shore resource control and safeguarding, the 
peacekeeping/making missions or securing the safety of SLOCs 
especially when the presence of an international force is most 
helpful.
The use of international diplomatic methods in solving 
the issues that may arise may seem as the optimum way for 
solving disputes. However, it must be remembered that v/here 
the diplomacy is not supported by military power to provide 
credence, all efforts are likely to end in failure. The degree 
of diplomatic persuasiveness, especially in subjects that 
involve territorial questions, depends on its credibility. 
Therefore it would not be wrong to assert that the diplomatic 
v/ays to solve a problem will also require the presence of a 
strong force in support of diplomatic efforts.
The possibilities for naval diplomacy in the form of 
gunboat diplomacy are numerous in the post-cold war era. It 
may be in the shape of an enforcement action taken by the 
major naval powers against smaller states that threaten the 
international SLOCs around. On the other hand the states that 
have regional aspirations may also take part in acts of 
gunboat diplomacy either against their neighbours or 
extra-regional powers by interdicting international SLOCs.
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The increase in the potential for conflictual situation 
will support the increased employment of the diplomatic role 
of the navy by the states. The Yellow Sea has been the chief 
area of gunboat diplomacy in the previous century. Today, the 
number of areas that offer potential for such missions has 
increased. The employment of naval diplomacy in the form of 
gunboat diplomacy must be expected in the emerging period.
During the cold war, Western navies led by the American 
navy in particular have enjoyed a largely successful 
capability to deter the other side from challenging the 
control of the sea under their control. The main opponent, the 
Soviet Navy was not capable of aggressive power projection and 
blue water operations, something even which its commanders 
admitted."'® Nuclear deterrence was the most central of all 
these tasks. The cold war's end will affect the military 
m.issions of the navies most. The different settings of the 
cold war are no longer adaptable to this new period which is 
emerging.
The chief role of the navies will remain as the military 
one. This is to be expected since the raison d'être of the 
navies is, by nature, military. The extent of a probable 
conflict has decreased. Therefore the naval missions will also 
reflect this change. In a different way from the rest of the 
naval roles, these changes will be reflected in the levels of 
operation of specific operations: while global power 
projection will be a less exercised option, the coastal and 
regional levels will increase in importance.
With the growing littorality in the naval environment, 
it must be expected that low level conflicts between the
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regional and coastal naval powers can occur. The military role 
of the navies will be exploited by these states in the pursuit 
of their national interests.
On the other hand the naval missions such as the global 
nuclear deterrence, huge amphibious operations, major surface 
actions for the command of the sea will not be as important as 
they were in the cold war period. They will diminish in 
importance as the naval operations such as the control of the 
sea areas around SLOCs, small scale power projection by 
regional navies will move into forward positions on the 
agendas of the naval leaders. The military role of the navy in 
the new period will reflect the trend for increasing 
littorality and the level and scope of the operations 
undertaken will also be regional and coastal.
This study has tried to analyze and identify the new 
conditions in the naval strategic environment. The conditions 
of naval environment that had spanned the last half century 
are now passing away. The post-cold war conditions are opening 
up new dimensions to the naval environment. Navies as one of 
the most important military branches of the states will modify 
their tasks to reflect the conditions of new strategic factors 
of the period.
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